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ABSTRACT
We present a theory and experimental evidence on pricing and portfolio choices
under asymmetric reasoning. We show that under asymmetric reasoning, prices do
not reflect all (types of) reasoning. Some agents who observe prices that cannot
be reconciled with their reasoning switch from perceiving the environment as risky
to perceiving it as ambiguous. If ambiguity averse, these agents become price-
insensitive and no longer influence prices directly. We present the results of an
experiment and report that consistent with the theory i) mispricing decreases as
the fraction of price-sensitive agents increases, and ii) price-insensitive agents trade
to more balanced portfolios.
JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14
Keywords: Asset pricing theory, disagreement, reasoning models, ambiguity
aversion, experimental finance, financial markets.
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I. Introduction
This paper explores the extent to which asymmetric reasoning is reflected in asset prices
and in the individual choices that support those prices. To do this we conduct a series of
laboratory experiments in which agents trade assets whose payoffs depend (in a known
way) on the (laboratory) state of the world. The prior probability distribution over states
of the world and a public signal about this distribution are available to all investors. If
all investors reasoned correctly, they would all use Bayes’ Rule to infer the true posterior
distribution over states of the world, and hence the true distribution of asset payoffs.
However, we create an environment in which application of Bayes’ Rule is difficult and
some investors do not apply it correctly; their reasoning is incorrect.1 In such an environ-
ment, the question we ask is whether and to what extent the correct/incorrect reasoning
of various investors is reflected in asset prices. Do prices reflect both correct and incorrect
reasoning?
Our experimental findings – supported by a simple theoretical model – demonstrate
how prices do not reflect the opinions of all investors who reason incorrectly. The ob-
served portfolio choices of investors and our theoretical model suggest an explanation:
confronted with prices that are at odds with their view of the world, investors who do
not reason correctly suspect that they may be wrong, and therefore view the financial
prospects as sufficiently ambiguous – rather than simply risky – so that they choose not
1That many individuals make errors in Bayesian updating – even in environments much simpler than
the ones we construct – has been confirmed in numerous experiments; see for instance Kahneman and
Tversky (1973); Grether (1992); El-Gamal and Grether (1995); Holt and Smith (2009).
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to be exposed to the perceived ambiguity. As a result, their incorrect reasoning is not
reflected in prices.2
Ambiguity aversion matters for pricing because the behavioral consequences of am-
biguity aversion are quite different from the behavioral consequences of risk aversion.
In particular, ambiguity aversion may lead some investors to avoid ambiguity altogether
by choosing portfolios whose payoffs are constant across the ambiguous states. Such
investors make choices that are independent of prices (for a range of prices that depends
on how ambiguity averse they are and how much ambiguity they perceive). If this is the
case then asset prices for securities whose payoffs are not constant across the ambiguous
states will be determined by investors who perceive only risk, not ambiguity, and who
therefore make choices that are dependent on prices. It is important to note that risk
aversion will almost never lead an investor to choose a riskless portfolio, so that the
choices of investors who are simply risk averse will be reflected in prices.3
Ambiguity aversion, like risk aversion, is thought of as a common and immutable
characteristic of individuals, perhaps even genetically pre-determined (Camerer and We-
ber, 1992; Cronqvist and Thaler, 2004; Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009) However, the perception
of ambiguity may arise depending on context. Here, we propose that the perception of
ambiguity is triggered endogenously when we present investors with difficult updating
2Ambiguity is sensed when one is not sure about the true probabilities; risk, on the other hand, is a
situation where one knows the probabilities objectively (Ellsberg, 1961).
3A caveat must be understood here. An agent who does not purchase a particular security does not
directly affect the price of that security, but might indirectly affect the price because his/her holding
of other securities affects supplies; hence the prices of all securities might be different from what they
would be if that agent were entirely absent from the market.
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problems: while objectively the situation involves only risk, a subject who has difficulty
solving the problems could have her confidence undermined, and may perceive ambigu-
ity if her own solution to the updating problem were very different from the solution
suggested by the market through the market price. Our proposal is inspired by an ear-
lier evidence that perception of ambiguity can be induced by mere confrontation with a
more authoritative source. Fox and Tversky (1995) find strong empirical support for the
hypothesis that “people’s confidence is undermined [...] when they compare themselves
with more knowledgeable individuals” and they argue that “this contrast between states
of knowledge is the predominant source of ambiguity aversion.” Our conjecture is that
the market plays this role of an authority with higher knowledge – whether it does is an
empirical question, and our experiments speak to this question.4
We develop an equilibrium theory of asset pricing with agents who reason asymmet-
rically. Our assumptions on individual behavior are adapted from the decision-theoretic
model of learning by Epstein and Schneider (2007), who explain that decision-makers’
confidence about the environment can change – along with their beliefs – in light of new
information. In their theory, each agent’s perception of ambiguity is dynamic and con-
textual. Our model uses a static snapshot of this idea. Epstein and Schneider (2008)
apply their theory of learning to asset pricing, using a single representative trader. This
trader is initially not ambiguous (as she has a single prior) but then observes an ambigu-
4An alternative theory that would lead to the same behavior and would also appeal to the comparative
ignorance argument is that of Chew and Sagi (2008). A trader who doubts her Bayesian inference would
prefer sources of uncertainty that do not depend on the Bayesian inference in question, and hence, like
an ambiguity averse agent, will attempt to avoid the ambiguity.
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ous signal about the asset (in our case, a confusing price, more generally a signal drawn
from a set of likelihoods), and this signal induces the trader to take into consideration
multiple priors. We derive the implications for equilibrium prices as financial markets ag-
gregate the asymmetric reasoning of multiple agents, some of whom behave as described
by Epstein and Schneider (2007, 2008), while others remain standard expected utility
maximizers who use a single prior and perceive only risk, not ambiguity. Our model
guides both the experimental design and the empirical approach. In the choice of a dif-
ficult updating task, we take inspiration from the well-known “Monty Hall problem.”5
The updating problems used in the experiment are even more involved than the Monty
Hall problem. To illustrate our experimental design, consider a setting where one state
(Arrow) security is traded.6 The security pays if a card drawn from a deck at the end of
trading is red. Initially, the deck contains two black cards (one spade and one club) and
two red cards (one heart and one diamond). One of the cards is randomly chosen and
discarded before trade starts, but subjects are not informed about which one. Subjects
are then allowed to trade one of the two securities for six minutes. Trading is halted in
minute three, when one card is picked out of the three remaining cards. This pick is not
5For a detailed overview of the problem, see http://mathforum.org/dr.math/faq/faq.monty.hall.html.
Monty Hall was the host of a popular weekly television show (aired in the 60’s) called “Let’s Make a
Deal.” In one portion of the show, Monty would present the contestant with three doors, one of which
concealed a prize. Monty would ask the contestant to pick a door; after which Monty – who knew
which door concealed the prize – would open one of the two remaining doors, never revealing the prize.
Monty would then offer the contestant the opportunity to switch to the other unopened door. Updating
correctly demonstrates that the probability that the original door conceals the prize is 1/3 – as it was
initially – so that switching dramatically increases the probability of success. However, many contestants
– and others – update incorrectly and believe that the probability that the original door conceals the
prize is 1/2, so that switching makes no difference.
6This is the second setting listed in Table 2.
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fully random: the heart card is never picked and randomization is only over the other
suits. The picked card is revealed to the subjects and discarded, thus leaving a deck of
only two cards. After this, trade resumes until the termination time, at which point one
of the remaining two cards is drawn, and the color of this card determines asset payoffs.
Subjects are fully informed about the details of this procedure to determine payoffs be-
fore trade starts, and this information presents them with quite a complicated Bayesian
updating problem.7
The equilibrium implications of our conjecture that investors lose confidence and sense
ambiguity when confronted with dissonant prices in the marketplace are as follows. Such
investors view asset payoffs as ambiguous, and this leads them to trade to a portfolio that
does not expose them to the ambiguity for any price within a range, where this range
depends on the investor’s ambiguity aversion and the perceived ambiguity. Because
they have become price-insensitive, these investors do not contribute directly to the
determination of the security prices. In contrast, agents who are confident in their ability
to update behave as if they know the true probabilities over outcomes, and hence regard
asset payoffs as merely risky rather than ambiguous. That is, payoffs are perceived to
follow a known distribution. Risk aversion affects the choices of such investors and hence
choices will be sensitive to prices. For example, they will not choose riskless portfolios
unless prices are consistent with risk neutrality. Because of their sensitivity to prices,
7Indeed, it requires careful calculation (that may amuse the reader) to determine the prior probability
before trading begins that the card drawn at the end of trading will be red (hint: it is strictly greater
than 0.5), or the posterior probability after the mid-trading halt.
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these investors do directly contribute to the determination of the security prices, as is
standard in theories of asset pricing.
Subjects are at times unreceptive to the correct way of reasoning in Monty Hall
problems even after experience that should have revealed their mistake (Friedman, 1998);
some agents who are confident in their updating ability may nevertheless be wrong, and
hence we do not expect prices to conform perfectly to theoretical predictions that would
obtain if all investors updated correctly. We shall assume that only agents with beliefs
that are sufficiently close to those reflected in prices remain confident. In addition, we
assume that subjects who reason correctly believe that their reasoning is correct and do
not perceive ambiguity. This seems to us to be reasonable but whether it is in fact true is
an empirical question. Providing support for this assumption, Halevy (2007) finds that
only 4% of agents who correctly reduce compound lotteries sense (and avoid) ambiguity in
the Ellsberg experiment (whereas a full 95% of agents who incorrectly reduce compound
lotteries exhibit this behavior).
In order to obtain clearer predictions, we consider two environments both in the the-
ory and in the experiments. In the first, there is no aggregate risk; in the second, there
is aggregate risk. When there is no aggregate risk, and if investors all update correctly,
equilibrium prices should be risk neutral with respect to the true probabilities (indepen-
dently of individual preferences). If investors do not all update correctly yet continue to
react to prices then prices may be different from risk neutral prices. Hence this treatment
provides a convenient test of price predictions. However, it does not provide a convenient
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test of portfolio predictions, because it may be impossible to distinguish between investors
who update correctly and investors who are ambiguity averse: if prices equal expected
payoffs at correct probabilities, then both choose portfolios that are devoid of risk. When
there is aggregate risk, equilibrium prices depend on the way individuals update and on
individual preferences, so we cannot readily test equilibrium price predictions. However,
the presence of aggregate risk provides a useful test of individual behavior: we predict
that investors who update correctly choose to hold some aggregate risk (provided prices
are not risk neutral), while investors who are ambiguity averse refrain from holding any
risk at all regardless of prices (within a range).
Our central predictions are: i) if there is no aggregate risk, prices should be closer to
expected payoffs based on the correct Bayesian inference as the proportion of subjects who
cannot make the correct Bayesian inferences decreases; the proportion of price-insensitive
subjects provides a lower bound to the latter number; ii) subjects who cannot update
correctly should hold ambiguity neutral portfolios (in our setting, these correspond to
balanced portfolios), while agents who can update should hold increasingly diverging
portfolios as the aggregate risk in the economy grows. These predictions are fully born
out in the data.
Our results shed light on recent experimental findings of Kluger and Wyatt (2004) who
also used a design suggested by the Monty Hall problem. Kluger and Wyatt found that if
at least two among the six subjects in their experimental market updated correctly, then
prices agreed with theoretical predictions. The authors explain this finding as resulting
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from Bertrand competition among those who update correctly. It seems to us that this
explanation begs the question: surely subjects who update incorrectly Bertrand compete
as well? And if subjects who update incorrectly Bertrand compete, why wouldn’t this
competition lead to the wrong prices? We provide an alternative explanation: those
who cannot compute the right probabilities perceive ambiguity, and, as a result, become
infra-marginal.
The idea that investors often reason incorrectly (or make cognitive mistakes) has been
a cornerstone of Behavioral Finance. Among others, investors mis-calibrate their beliefs
through overconfidence (Daniel et al., 1998, 2001), fall prey to gambler’s and hot hand
fallacies (Rabin and Vayanos, 2009), or do not fully grasp their environment, displaying
representativeness bias and conservatism (Barberis et al., 1998).8 To study how these
examples of incorrect reasoning impact prices, the representative agent framework is
employed, and hence, the theory effectively assumes that all agents are equal. This
excludes asymmetry in reasoning. One of our contributions is to explicitly allow for such
asymmetry.
There also exists a large literature that studies competitive equilibrium when agents
are Bayesian (and hence, make no mistakes in updating) but employ different beliefs.
One variant assumes that agents use different likelihoods to interpret the signals they
receive. The differences in likelihoods could be viewed as a way to model asymmetric
8Both the model in Rabin and Vayanos (2009) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) fall in the
category of quasi-Bayesian models, whereby agents apply Bayes rule to all but one or two parameters of
the model.
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reasoning, and as such, the approach is relevant for our study. Harris and Raviv (1993),
for instance, study the impact on equilibrium prices when investors stick to their likeli-
hoods, and as such, never agree. But why should investors continue to disagree? Our
contribution is to model what happens when investors introspect when confronted with
the fact that they disagree. Another approach is to assume that all investors use the
same likelihood but start from different priors. This too could be viewed as a way to
model asymmetric reasoning, as long as the differences in priors cannot be explained by
differences in information (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Basak, 2005; Cao and Ou-Yang,
2009; Hong and Sraer, 2012). However, in a market with differing opinions, would ra-
tional investors not feel discomfort when prices (which reflect some weighted average of
the beliefs) do not conform to their beliefs? We model how agents behave when they
confront discordant prices, and we analyze the consequences of their behavior.
Absent shortsale restrictions or other constraints on trading, if investors persist in
their beliefs, prices reflect an average belief (Williams, 1977; Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina,
2002). That is, every belief contributes to determining the prices. Since at most one set
of beliefs can be correct (at times no beliefs may be correct), if errors are systematic
across agents, this implies that prices must be wrong (prices will be right only if errors
cancel out exactly). However, this is not satisfactory from an empirical point of view:
Fama (1998) and Malkiel (2003), among others, have argued that the frequency of per-
sistent pricing anomalies is low and on balance the evidence is in favor of approximately
correct pricing. Our contribution is to show how prices are largely immune to systematic
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errors by a large fraction of investors. In our environment prices affect these investors’
beliefs, rather than being affected by them.
Traditional game theory has long argued that it may not be reasonable for two agents
to knowingly differ in their beliefs, i.e., to “agree to disagree.” Instead, if there are any
differences in beliefs, they must eventually be traced to differences in information – this is
the “common prior assumption” of Harsanyi (1967). Hence, in traditional game theory,
there is no asymmetric reasoning. Following Morris (1995), more recent game theory has
allowed for deviations from the strict common prior assumption.9 One alternative way
in which game theory has embraced differences in reasoning, is by considering agents
who disagree on what is the set of conceivable states (Karni and Vierø, 2013). In these
attempts to accommodate disagreement in a strategic setting, at one point one must
confront the fact that two agents who disagree ought to realize that only one of them (at
most) can be correct. In the multi-stage speculation game of Biais and Bossaerts (1998),
for instance, rational investors meet others at regular points in time, and every time they
disagree (with probability 1), but no-one ever stops to wonder whether this makes sense.
Our contribution is to propose a resolution if players were to wonder.
An alternative approach to tackling the difficulty of having two rational agents agree-
ing to disagree is to limit belief differences to events whose probabilities cannot be verified.
9Most work focuses on how (Bayesian) agents with different priors can end up with polarized (di-
vergent) posterior beliefs even if they observe the same sequence of signals (Dixit and Weibull, 2007;
Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz, 2009; Sethi and Yildiz, 2012). Both the idea that disagreement
cannot occur if agents observe the same information and the idea that agents can become more polarized
have been critized, but this is beyond the scope of our study. See Andreoni and Mylovanov (2012) and
Baliga, Hanany, and Klibanoff (2013).
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In this vain, Anderson and Sonnenschein (1985) present a model where beliefs are formed
by combining models with data. If agents have access to the same data, their beliefs are
allowed to deviate only to the extent that their models differ. Kurz, Jin, and Motolese
(2005) assume that all agents have access to the same countably infinite, stationary time
series, so that they can only disagree about the probabilities of non-ergodic events.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theory and
the empirical implications. Section III describes our experiments in detail. Section IV
presents the empirical results. Sections V and VI discuss our results in light of alternative
explanations and conclude.
II. Theory and Empirical Implications
In this section we present a simple asset market model that unfolds over two dates: trade
takes place only at date 0; consumption takes place only at date 1. There is a single
consumption good.
Let there be a continuum of agents, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], two assets R and B, or
Red and Black stock, and two states of the world, r and b. At date 0 the realization of
the state is not known to the agents. At date 1 agents learn the realization of the state,
securities pay off, and consumption takes place. The two assets are Arrow securities: In
state j ∈ {r, b}, asset J ∈ {R,B} pays one unit of wealth, and the other asset pays no
wealth.
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Let pir be the probability that state r occurs, and pib = 1 − pir the probability that
state b occurs (note that pij is equal to the expected value of asset J). Public information
is available with which to compute pij. Agents use different ways to obtain this number
based on the publicly available information. As a result, beliefs about pij may not agree.
Let piij be the subjective probability that state j occurs, as calculated by agent i.
We assume that a proportion α of all agents use the correct reasoning, i.e., can
compute the true probability. Without loss of generality, we assume that these are the
agents with highest index i: piir = pir for i ∈ [1−α, 1]. The rest of the agents i ∈ [0, 1−α)
compute the probability of state r incorrectly. Their mistake is proportional to the value
of their index i, and hence, all mistaken beliefs are below the correct belief: agent i has
a subjective probability
piir = pi +
pir − pi
1− α i,
where pi is the minimal possible belief. The belief schedule is depicted in Figure 1.
Note that we have chosen the true probability to be on the boundary of the belief
space, thus creating a setup where the agents with wrong beliefs have the strongest
potential to influence asset prices. We could have assumed that mistaken beliefs are
above correct beliefs, but this does not change the conclusions qualitatively. If correct
beliefs are somehow in the middle, then wrong beliefs above and below it would cancel,
and hence, wrong beliefs would not have as much an impact.
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As to the total supplies of the assets R and B, we consider two treatments. In
Treatment I, the aggregate endowment of assets R and B is the same, so there is no
aggregate risk in the economy. In Treatment II, there is aggregate risk because supplies
of R and B are different.
In Treatment I, at date 0 each agent is endowed with an equal number of R and of B,
without loss of generality, one unit of each. One can think of each agent as the aggregation
of heterogeneously endowed agents who share the same beliefs piir. In Treatment II, there
are more units of B than of R. In the experiments, for each unit of R, the aggregate
agent holds 1.16 units of B.
Let wi be the wealth of agent i at date 1, after the state of the world is revealed.
For simplicity, assume a logarithmic form for the utility that agent i derives from final
wealth, i.e., u(wi) = ln(wi).
Agents may trade their endowments at date 0. Let pR be the market prices of asset
R at date 0. Absence of arbitrage dictates that the price of asset B must be pB = 1−pR.
Let (Bi, Ri) be the holdings of Black and Red securities after agents i trades.
We first derive the equilibrium choices and prices assuming that all agents maximize
expected utility with their own subjective beliefs, undisturbed by prices that may sug-
gest that their beliefs are wrong. That is, the equilibrium assumes that agents “agree to
disagree.” Subsequently, we determine what happens when agents with incorrect reason-
ing face prices that challenge their beliefs. We can compute the equilibrium explicitly if
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we know the distribution of agents in [0, 1]. For convenience, we assume here that this
distribution is uniform.
Agreeing To Disagree
Treatment I
In Treatment I, the initial wealth of i is w0i = pR1+(1−pR)1 = 1, so her optimization
problem is
max
{Ri,Bi}
{piir ln(Ri) + (1− piir) ln(Bi) } s.t. pRRi + (1− pR)Bi = 1. (1)
The first order conditions for optimality imply that
Ri =
piir
pR
, Bi =
1− piir
1− pR .
Hence for any given price vector, the relative demand of agent i for asset R (as a fraction
of the total demand for assets R and B) is increasing in the subjective probability piir.
The vector of all subjective probabilities by all agents determines the equilibrium prices.
If all agents correctly compute the true probability of state j, i.e., if α=1, in the
absence of aggregate uncertainty all agents trade so as to attain a balanced portfolio of 1
unit of each security. This ensures equilibrium, and from the above first-order conditions,
the equilibrium prices can be deduced to be: pR = pir and pB = 1− pir.
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If instead α < 1 and if all agents maximize expected utility based on their subjective
beliefs then the equilibrium prices will aggregate the beliefs of all agents. Since the
correct belief about the red state are the most optimistic, it follows that the equilibrium
price of the Red security will be below the correct belief, pR < pir. As a result, pB > pib.
Treatment II
In Treatment II, there is aggregate risk because the Red asset R is scarcer than the
Black asset B. If all agents correctly compute the true probabilities, the equilibrium price
of Red will be above the probability of the red state (and hence, the expected payoff on the
Red security), so that demand for Red is dampened: pR > pir. The resulting ratio
pR
pB
will
be higher than the odds ratio of the two states pir
pib
. If instead α < 1, the equilibrium prices
aggregate the beliefs of all agents, causing pR to be lower than it would be if all agents
updated correctly. The exact equilibrium price that is determined by the magnitude
1− α, the relative scarcity of Red and the risk attitudes of the agents (represented here
by logarithmic utility).
Disagreement Leads To Doubt And To a Perception of Ambiguity
The above equilibrium assumes that, when confronted with prices that contradict
their computations, agents continue to use their subjective beliefs in determining optimal
demands. In what follows we drop this very assumption and hypothesize instead that
from the agents who do not hold the correct belief pir, only those whose beliefs are
within  of the market price continue to use their subjective probabilities. Each of
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the rest of the agents, confronted with the dissonance between the market price and
her subjective probability, realizes that she may have made a mistake and computed the
wrong probabilities. We conjecture that in these circumstances agents perceive ambiguity
because they no longer trust their own computations, while doubting the belief reflected
in prices (because they cannot manage to justify these beliefs either). As a result, rather
than agreeing to disagree with the market, the agents completely disregard their prior
and conclude that no reasonable beliefs can be established, leading them to perceive
ambiguity.
We make the technical assumption that  < α
1+α
(pir − pi). This puts an upper bound
on the fraction of agents with incorrect beliefs who nevertheless agree to disagree (with
the price). This assumption ensures that a strictly positive fraction of agents become
price-insensitive in equilibrium. Otherwise we would be back in the above equilibrium,
where all agents “agree to disagree.” We model choice under ambiguity using the maxmin
decision rule of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), which implies that agents are ambiguity
averse.10
10Alternatively, one could use the theory in Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) to model
the behavior of agents who face ambiguity. Their utility representation α − max min utility function
Ui(Ri, Bi) = αmin{u(Ri), u(Bi)} + (1 − α) max{u(Ri), u(Bi)}, where the coefficient α measures the
degree of ambiguity aversion (not to be confused with α in this paper, which measures the fraction of
agents who correctly compute probabilities); α = 1/2 corresponds to ambiguity neutrality, and α = 1 is
the extreme degree of ambiguity aversion as in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). With this utility function,
agents are price insensitive for prices in the range [1 − α, α]. There are other types of preferences that
generate ambiguity aversion. Yet the empirical findings in this paper, and those in Bossaerts et al. (2010),
demonstrate that a significant fraction of subjects are price-insensitive, while their choices reveal that
they avoid ambiguity. As such, the data favor a model of kinked preferences, of which the α−max min
is an important member.
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An agent with max min preferences who believes that pir may take any value in [0, 1]
solves the optimization problem:
max
{Ri,Bi}
min
pi∈[0,1]
{pi ln(Ri) + (1− pi) ln(Bi)} s.t. pRRi + (1− pR)Bi = 1. (2)
If Ri > Bi, then minpi∈[0,1]{pi ln(Ri) + (1−pi) ln(Bi)} = ln(Bi). Similarly, if Ri < Bi, then
minpi∈[0,1]{pi ln(Ri) + (1− pi) ln(Bi)} = ln(Ri), so the optimization problem simplifies to
max
{Ri,Bi}
min{ln(Ri), ln(Bi)} s.t. pRRi + (1− pR)Bi = 1. (3)
From here it immediately follows that the agent seeks a portfolio with Ri = Bi under
any prices pR and pB = 1− pR.11
Importantly, demands of ambiguity averse agents who perceive ambiguity do not
depend on relative prices. As a result, these agents are price-insensitive.
We could consider a more general version of the optimization problem (2), assuming
that the set of priors over pi held by agents who perceive ambiguity is smaller than [0, 1],
so that there exist piL, piH such that 0 ≤ piL ≤ piH ≤ 1 and agents who distrust their own
computations solve the optimization problem
max
{Ri,Bi}
min
pi∈[piL,piH ]
{pi ln(Ri) + (1− pi) ln(Bi)} s.t. pRRi + (1− pR)Bi = 1. (4)
11This result generalizes if we drop the assumption of logarithmic utility. Let u(wi) be any strictly
increasing function. Ambiguity averse agents who solve max min{u(Ri), u(Bi)} seek balanced portfolios
(equal number of R and B securities).
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In this case, an ambiguity averse agent seeks a balance porfolio with Ri = Bi under
any price pR ∈ [piL, piH ]. As a result, the agent is price-insensitive for the range of prices
[piL, piH ]. For simplicity, we follow the special case [piL, piH ] = [0, 1].
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In contrast, knowledgeable agents continue to submit optimal demands based on
their own beliefs. With a fraction α of such agents, their demands for R add up to
qα =
∫ 1
1−αRi = α
pir
pR
. Thus, for any pR < pir the knowledgeable agents create a total
excess demand equal to α
(
pir
pR
− 1
)
. Notice that knowledgeable agents are price-sensitive.
There is a third category of agents, namely those with incorrect reasoning but whose
beliefs are within  of the market price. We assume that these agents continue to optimize
given their beliefs. Because  < α
1+α
(pir − pi) and α ≤ 1, it follows  < pir−pi2 .
An equilibrium is such that agents who stick to their beliefs (either because they are
correct in their calculations, or because their calculations are close to the market price)
solve the optimization problem (1); agents who perceive ambiguity maximize expression
(2); and the market clears at the equilibrium price so that the aggregate demand of each
asset is one. Let q(i, pR) be the quantity of Red asset demanded by agent i at price pR.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a price p∗R and an individual demand function q :
[0, 1]× R+ −→ R such that
(i) q(i, pR) = arg max{Ri}
{piir ln(Ri) + (1− piir) ln(Bi)} s.t. pRRi + (1− pR)Bi = 1 for any
i such that piir ∈ [p∗R − , p∗R + ] ∪ pir.
12Notice that “agreeing to disagree” corresponds to the opposite special case in which piL = piH = pi
i
r.
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(ii) q(i, pR) = arg max{Ri}
min{ln(Ri), ln(Bi)} s.t. pRRi + (1− pR)Bi = 1 for any i such
that piir 6∈ [p∗R − , p∗r + ] ∪ pir.
(iii)
∫ 1
0
q(i, p∗r)di = 1.
Treatment I
Consider Treatment I and conjecture that prices will be sufficiently close to correct
beliefs (we will verify later that this is true in equilibrium) such that pR +  > pir > pR >
pR− > pi. Let i be the agent such that piir = pR−, that is, i = 1−αpir−pi (pR−−pi). Therefore,
the total excess demand generated by agents with (incorrect) beliefs sufficiently close to
pir equals: ∫ 1−α
i
(
piir
p
− 1
)
di.
In the Appendix (A.3), we show that, since piir = pi + i
pir−pi
(1−α) ,
∫ 1−α
i
(
piir
pR
− 1
)
di =
1− α
2pR(pir − pi)(pir − pR + )(pir − pR − ).
Because (pir − pR − ) < 0, the excess demand is negative, i.e., the biased agents provide
excess supply to the market.
In equilibrium the aggregate excess demand must be zero:
1− α
2pR(pir − pi)(pir − pR + )(pir − pR − ) + α
(
pir
pR
− 1
)
= 0.
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In the Appendix (A.4), we prove the following.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium exists. If α > 0, this equilibrium is unique and the price
of the Red security is
pR = pir −
√(α(pir − pi)
1− α
)2
+ 2 − α(pir − pi)
1− α
 .
Notice that equilibrium prices satisfy the conjectured restriction used to derive total
excess demands of agents with incorrect beliefs within  of the market price, namely,
pR +  > pir > pR > pR −  > pi. See Figure 5 for a depiction of the equilibrium.
The main comparative statics properties of equilibrium prices in Treatment I are as
follows. Define |pir − pR| to be the mispricing in the marketplace.
Corollary 1. Mispricing decreases in α and increases in .
Corollary 1 states that mispricing decreases with the fraction of agents who know how
to correctly compute probabilities, and increases as more agents with incorrect beliefs
“agree to disagree” even if their beliefs are more distant from the market price.
Neither the fraction α nor the critical distance  are directly observable, however.
We need an empirically more relevant statement; one that we can verify in experiments.
There, we observe not only prices, but also subjects’ choices and how these choices
change when prices change. Therefore, we propose to translate the corollary into the
following empirically verifiable statement. Let S denote the fraction agents who remain
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price-sensitive (either because they know how to correctly compute probabilities or their
beliefs are within  of the correct beliefs). S equals:
S = α + (+ pir − pR) 1− α
pir − pi .
Note that S is readily measurable: it suffices to identify which agents change their choices
as prices change.
Corollary 2. Mispricing decreases as S increases.
Both Corollaries 1 and 2 are proved in the Appendix (A.5).
We check that our results are robust if  varies across agents. Consider the simplest
case, where there are two types of agents, one that percieve ambiguity only if their (sub-
jective) probability is more than ε away from market prices, and another that perceive
ambiguity only if their probability is more than δ (≤ ε) away. As proved in the Ap-
pendix (A.6), mispricing continues to decrease with the fraction of agents α who know
how to correctly compute probabilities. Moreover, mispricing decreases as the number
of price-sensitive agents increases. Thus, both Corollaries 1 and 2 continue to hold when
the individual price-sensitivity cutoff points are heterogeneous across agents.13
13One could enrich the theory even further and allow heterogeneity in perceived ambiguity. The idea
would be to let the amount of perceived ambiguity increase with cognitive dissonance, while assuming
that ambiguity aversion (once it emerges) remains the same across agents. Perceived ambiguity can be
reduced by limiting the set of probabilities that the agent considers possible. In this version of the theory,
all agents up to a certain level (of cognitive dissonance) would still remain price-sensitive, though. Those
beyond that level would become entirely price-insensitive. Since the pricing and allocation predictions
depend solely on dichotomous price sensitivity, the empirical implications of this richer theory would
remain the same.
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Treatment II
In Treatment II, equilibrium choices of price-sensitive agents (those with correct be-
liefs, and those with incorrect beliefs that are nevertheless within  of the truth) are
affected by the unbalanced supply of Red and Black securities. Price-insensitive agents
(those with incorrect beliefs more than  away from the truth) choose to hold balanced
portfolios (equal amounts of Red and Black securities), so only price-sensitive agents
are willing to accommodate the imbalance in supply of Red and Black securities. The
exact equilibrium prices depend on the relative supplies of Red and Black securities, and
on the number and risk preferences of price-sensitive agents. We took the latter to be
logarithmic, but any other (risk averse) preference would do in order to generate the
asserted portfolio effects (the choices of price-insensitive agents do not depend on the
posited utility function, as mentioned before). For any market prices, the price-sensitive
agents collectively absorb all the risk, acquiring more units of Black asset than of Red as-
set. This implies that the individual equilibrium portfolio holdings of the price-sensitive
agents are (generically) unbalanced.
In Treatment II, an equilibrium exists (the proof is available from the authors),14 but
pricing predictions are ambivalent because prices are affected not only by beliefs, but
also by the imbalance in relative supplies of Red and Black securities, the exact number
of price-sensitive agents, and their risk aversion. Equilibrium holding predictions are,
however, unequivocal: price-sensitive agents choose to invest in unbalanced portfolios,
14All the additional material that we mention as “available from the authors” is publicly accessible at
http://uleef.business.utah.edu/SuppInfo/AsyReasonSupp/ABEZSup.pdf.
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while price-insensitive agents buy balanced portfolios (with an equal number of Red and
Black securities).
Thus, our theory has three main testable predictions:
Hypothesis 1. There are price-insensitive subjects, i.e., subjects whose choices do not
change as (relative) prices change.
Hypothesis 2. In Treatment I, mispricing |pir−pR| decreases with the fraction of price-
sensitive subjects, S.
Hypothesis 3. In Treatment II, price-insensitive subjects hold more balanced portfolios
than price-sensitive subjects.
A Dynamic Interpretation of Asymmetric Reasoning
We posit that some agents who observe a signal (the market price) that clashes with
their prior about the state of the world (based on their calculation of the probability
that the state is Red), do not engage in the cognitively challenging task of updating
to generate a posterior. Rather, they become confused, they disregard their previous
reasoning about the strategic environment, and thereafter, uncertain about the correct
probabilities, they perceive ambiguity and they optimize as ambiguity averse agents.
Definition 1 defines an equilibrium as the static outcome of this process.
Our model of individual behavior is best interpreted as an adaptation of Epstein and
Schneider’s (2007) dynamic theory of learning under ambiguity. According to Epstein
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and Schneider (2007), agents are uncertain about a parameter that represents the state
of the world, and are also uncertain about the process that generates signals about the
parameter. This second source of uncertainty distinguishes their model from a tradi-
tional Bayesian-updating learning model. In our application, the parameter is pir, the
probability that the state is Red. The signal is the market price.
Epstein and Schneider (2007) argue that agents simultaneously entertain various the-
ories about the environment. A theory consists of a prior probability distribution about
the parameter, and an assumed process that generates signals given a parameter value.
Observing a signal, an agent calculates a posterior about the parameter, one posterior
for each theory under consideration. Then she evaluates each of the theories according
to the likelihood that it generated the observed signal. The agent uses all the theories
that perform sufficiently well in the likelihood test, as follows: given a choice, the agent
evaluates the expected utility for this choice under each theory that performs well in the
likelihood test, then takes the minimum across theories, and assigns this value to the
choice. The agent, finally, picks the choice with the highest value. In subsequent periods,
new signals lead to a re-evaluation of each theory in the likelihood test, and thus they
can lead to different reasoning and choices.
We can interpret the individual behavior of the agents in our model as a special case
of this model of learning, in which the unknown parameter is pir, and in which the agents
who compute probabilities incorrectly consider two alternative theories:
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a) pir = pi
i
r and pr is distributed uniformly in [pir − , pir + ].
b) pir is drawn from an unknown distribution with positive density in [0, 1], and for
any pir, pr is drawn from a uniform distribution in [0, 1], so that nothing about pir can be
inferred from from the observed pr.
As long as pr ∈ [pir − , pir + ], the first theory performs better in the likelihood
test, and thus the agent uses it to make choices that are consistent with expected utility
maximization with posterior piir. On the other hand, if pr 6∈ [pir − , pir + ], the first
theory is refuted, the agent discards it, and embraces the second one. Under the second
theory the agent perceives the environment to be ambiguous and being ambiguity averse,
the agent makes choices that are price-insensitive. (In repetition the agent may switch
theories and become price-sensitive again).
Our model omits this dynamic process on the formation of individual decision-making
reasoning, to present directly the market equilibrium end result, where market prices
are driven by the aggregation of the individual behavior of all agents: some agents
(those who compute probabilities correctly, and those whose incorrect computations are
seemingly vindicated by the signal of the market price) reason as standard expected utility
maximizers with their own beliefs about the state of the world; other agents (those who
compute probabilities incorrectly, and whose computations are called into question by
the market price) reason as ambiguity averse agents with maximal uncertainty about the
state of the world.
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III. Experiments
Sessions Overview
We conducted nine experimental sessions in total, six corresponding to Treatment I
(involving markets with no aggregate risk), and three corresponding to Treatment II (with
aggregate risk). The participants were undergraduate and graduate students from the
following universities: (i) Caltech (one session), (ii) UCLA (four sessions, including the
three Treatment II sessions), (iii) University of Utah (two sessions), (iv) simultaneously
at Caltech and University of Utah with equal participation from both subject pools
(two sessions).15 Subjects received a sign-up reward of $5, which was theirs to keep no
matter what happened in the experiment. Each session lasted approximately two hours
in total and the average earnings from participation were $49 per subject (including the
$5 sign-up reward).
Twenty subjects participated in each of the nine sessions. Prior experimental re-
search16 indicates that this is sufficient for markets like ours, organized as a continuous
double auction, to be liquid enough, so that the bid-ask spread is small. In our case it
rarely exceeded two or three ticks (the tick size was set at 1 U.S. cent). All accounting
in the experimental sessions was done in US dollars.
15We recruited participants from three different campuses in order to obtain greater variability in
the subject pool and observed data. The experimental laboratories where we ran our experiments are:
Caltech’s SSEL, UCLA’s CASSEL and the University of Utah’s ULEEF.
16See Bossaerts and Plott (2002) and Bossaerts and Plott (2004).
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Upon arrival at the experimental laboratory, subjects were seated in front of com-
puter terminals and received a set of written instructions. Each session began by the
experimenter reading aloud the instructions, while also projecting them on a large screen.
During the instruction period, if subjects had any questions, they were asked to raise
their hands, and the experimenter would answer the questions. No oral communication
between subjects was allowed. They communicated their decisions via the computer
terminals.
Following the instruction period was a practice session, where subjects familiarized
themselves with the rules of trading and the trading software (described in more detail
below). The instruction and practice trading periods lasted approximately one hour
and concluded with a questionnaire to the subjects to ascertain they understood the
trading mechanism and the payoff structure of the traded securities. There was a 15-
minute break between the instructional period and the actual trading session, which
lasted approximately 45 minutes.
Markets
The time in the actual trading session was split into eight intervals, which we call
replications. At the start of each replication subjects received endowments consisting of
units of three securities. Two of them were risky and one was risk free. The risk-free
security, or Bond, always paid $0.50 at the end of the replication. The two risky securities
were referred to as Red Stock and Black Stock. The liquidation value (the amount each
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risky security pays at the end of a replication) of Red Stock and Black Stock was either
$0.50 or $0. Red and Black Stock were complementary securities: when Red Stock paid
$0.50, Black Stock paid nothing, and vice versa. Red Stock paid $0.50 when the “last
card” (to be specified below) in a simple card game was red (hearts or diamonds); Black
Stock paid $0.50 when this “last card” was black (spades or clubs). Thus, instead of
being explicitly provided with the probability distributions of the securities’ payoffs, the
subjects were presented with the description of Card Game Situations that determined
those probabilities. The experiment used four such Card Game Situations. In the se-
quence of eight independent replications each of the four different Card Game Situations
was implemented exactly twice.
Except for the presentation of the securities’ payoff probabilities, the session setup
was that of a standard experimental market.17 Trade took place through a web-based,
electronic continuous open-book system called jMarkets.18 A snap shot of the trading
screen is provided in Figure 2.
Within each replication, subjects were initially endowed with Red (R) and Black Stock
(B) as well as cash. The Bonds were in zero net supply, and subjects started without
Bonds in their endowment portfolios. Because of the presence of cash, the Bond was a
redundant security. Subjects were allowed to short sell the Bond if they wished. Short
17See, for example, Bossaerts et al. (2010) and Meloso, Copic, and Bossaerts (2009).
18This open-source trading platform was developed at Caltech and is freely available under the GNU
license. See http://jmarkets.ssel.caltech.edu/. The trading interface is simple and intuitive. It avoids
jargon such as “book,” “bid,” “ask,” etc. The entire trading process is point-and-click. That is, subjects
do not enter numbers (quantities, prices); instead, they merely point and click to submit orders, to trade,
or to cancel orders.
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sales of Bonds correspond to borrowing. Subjects could use such short sales to acquire
more stocks.
Subjects were given an unequal supply of the two risky securities; some started with
12 units of R and 3 of B; while others started with 9 units of B and no units of R
(but with more cash). In the six sessions corresponding to Treatment I, the aggregate
endowment of R and B was equal, and hence, there was no aggregate risk in the mar-
ketplace (because the payments on Red and Black Stock were complementary). In the
three sessions corresponding to Treatment II, there were more subjects with endowments
tilted towards B than subjects with endowments tilted towards R, so in the aggregate
there were fewer units of Red Stock than Black Stock, and hence, there was aggregate
risk. Table 1 provides additional details of the experimental design.19
While subjects could freely trade Red Stock and Bonds, they were barred from trading
Black Stock. This is an important experimental design feature. In Treatment I, where
there was no aggregate risk, equilibrium allocations may be indeterminate if all securi-
ties could be traded freely. First, ambiguity averse agents would like to hold balanced
portfolios no matter what the prices are. There are many such balanced portfolios: one
of R (Red Stock) and B (Black Stock) each, two of each; three of each; etc. Second,
price-sensitive agents would want to hold balanced portfolios as well when prices equal
expected payoffs (i.e., carry no risk premium), which is possible in equilibrium because
there is no aggregate risk. Again, there are many portfolios that are balanced. If the
19The Instructions for the experiment are provided in Appendix C.
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market for B is closed, however, the only way to obtain balanced portfolios is to trade
to positions in R that match one’s holdings of B.
We consider it an important feature of our design that subjects had a reason to trade
besides “agreeing to disagree” (effectively speculating that one’s reasoning is better than
that of others). Specifically, subjects were initially given an unequal supply of the two
securities even in Treatment I. Because subjects are generally risk averse even for the
relatively low levels of risk in our experiment (Holt and Laury, 2002; Bossaerts and
Zame, 2006), there are gains from trading to more balanced positions. To put this
differently: we would have seen trade even if all subjects agreed on how to correctly
compute probabilities.
Subjects were allowed to short sell R, in case they thought R was overpriced. To avoid
bankruptcy (and in accordance with classical general equilibrium theory), our trading
software constantly checked subjects’ budget constraints. In particular, subjects could
not submit an order such that, if it and the subject’s other standing orders were to go
through, the subject would generate net negative earnings in at least one state. Only
orders that were within 20% of the best standing bid or ask in the marketplace were
taken into account for the bankruptcy checks. Since markets were invariably thick, orders
outside this 20% band were effectively non-executable, and hence, deemed irrelevant. The
bankruptcy checks were effective: no agent ever ended up with negative earnings in our
experiments.
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The Game
Each replication of a Card Game Situation consisted of two periods. Thus, with eight
replications and two periods per replications, there were sixteen periods (numbered from
0 to 15) per experimental session. The (end-of-replication) liquidation values of Red
Stock and Black stock were determined through card games played by a computer and
communicated to the subjects orally and through the News web page; see Figure 3 for a
snapshot of the page (the table on the page is filled gradually as information comes in).
The card games were inspired by the Monty Hall problem.
One of the four Card Game Situations (the second one listed on Table 2) is as follows.
The computer starts a new replication with four cards (one spades, one clubs, one dia-
monds, and one hearts), randomly shuﬄed, and face down. Cards are eliminated during
the game and subjects are told the rules of card elimination. The color of the last card
to be picked determines the payoffs of the two risky securities (if red, R pays, if black, B
pays). The rules of card elimination determine the probability of the last card being red.
Again, subjects are not given this probability explicitly, they are only told of the rules of
the game. Trade starts for one 3-minute period. Upon the conclusion of this first period,
trading is halted. At that point, the computer discards one card without revealing it
to the subjects. Three cards remain. Then the computer picks one card from the three
remaining cards, as follows. If the discarded card was hearts, the computer picks one
card at random from the three remaining cards. If the hearts card is in the three remain-
ing cards, the computer picks randomly from the other two (non-heart) cards. The card
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that was picked is then revealed to the subjects, both orally and through the News web
page, and then discarded. Two cards remain. Trade starts again, for another 3 minutes
(period 2 of the card game replication). At the end of this second period, after markets
close, the computer picks one of the two remaining cards at random. This card, called
the last card is then revealed and determines which stock pays. If the last card is red
(diamonds, hearts) then Red Stock (R) pays $0.50. If the last card is black, then Black
Stock (B) pays $0.50. Each subject’s payoff is determined by his/her holdings at the end
of the second trading period and by the color of the last card.
Four variations on this game (each replicated twice), were played. Table 2 provides
details of the four Card Games Situations. They differ in terms of the number of cards
discarded and/or revealed after the first period, and the restriction on which cards would
be revealed. This provided a rich set of equilibrium prices (in Treatment I, where prices
could be identified uniquely because there was no aggregate risk) and changes of prices
(or absence thereof) after the first period revelation. The probabilities of the last card
being red, both before and after the elimination between the two periods are listed on
Table 2.
Detailed information about the drawing of cards is in the set of experimental instruc-
tions provided to the subjects (see Appendix C). In addition, before each period, the
experimenter reiterated the drawing rules to be applied in the coming period, to be sure
subjects knew which card game applied.
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To determine to what extent subjects understood the instructions, the (oral) ques-
tionnaire included questions such as “In the game where the computer never reveals a
red card after the first trading period, will you be surprised to see a black card revealed?”
Or, “If the computer initially discards one card, and then shows one black card when it
could have also shown diamonds, does the chance that the last card is black decrease as
a result?”
During the trading periods, the News web page was projected on the screen at the
times when cards were being discarded or drawn. For the rest of the time, the large
screen was projecting the development of the order book as well as the transaction prices
chart.
IV. Empirical Analysis
In this section we describe the data, report the number of price-insensitive subjects,
assess the level of mispricing and how this correlates with the number of price-sensitive
subjects, and then present a correlation study of portfolio choice and price sensitivity.
Raw Data
The data collected during the experimental sessions consists of all posted orders and
cancellations for all subjects along with their transactions and the transaction prices for
the Red Stock (R) and the Bond. (Remember that subjects could not trade the Black
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Stock B.) Figure 4 displays the evolution of transaction prices for R in the six sessions
for Treatment I (no aggregate risk). Time is on the horizontal axis (in seconds). Solid
vertical lines delineate card game replications; dashed vertical lines indicate between-
period pauses when the computer revealed one or two cards. Horizontal line segments
indicate predicted price levels assuming prices equal expected payoffs computed with
correct probabilities. Each star is a trade. Volume is large: over 1,100 trades take place
typically during an experimental session, or one transaction per 2.5 seconds.
Figures 4b and 4c display trading prices in two experiments respectively featuring low
and high number of price-sensitive subjects. In Figure 4b (Utah-1), observed transaction
prices appear to be rather unreactive to changes in true payoff probabilities. In contrast,
in Figure 4c, which corresponds to Utah-Caltech-1 (where half of the subjects are from
Caltech, and half are from the University of Utah) prices are close to expected payoffs
– reflecting correct probabilities. The comparison suggests that there might be cohort
effects in our data.
In Utah-1 (Figure 4b), prices appear to be insensitive to variations in the card games.
There were also a very large number of price-insensitive subjects (to be discussed later),
indicating that the pricing we observe in that experiment may reflect an equilibrium
with only ambiguity averse subjects: when there are only ambiguity averse subjects,
equilibrium prices will not react to the information provided to subjects in the different
card games, and any price level is an equilibrium. Notice that prices in Utah-1 indeed
started out around the relatively arbitrary level of $0.45 and stayed there during the
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entire experiment. A notable exception is period 2 of replication 1, when it was certain
that the last card would be red and hence that the Red Stock would pay, because the two
revealed cards were black. Prices adjusted correctly, proving that subjects were paying
attention and able to enter orders correctly, so that neither lack of understanding of the
rules of the game or unfamiliarity with the trading interface can explain the information-
insensitive pricing in the other periods.
The third column of Table 3 reports how far observed prices were on average from
the true expected payoffs in Treatment I, stratified by experimental session and Card
Game (in U.S. cents; average across transactions).20 The data reveal that there is a
wide variability in mispricing, both across experimental sessions, Utah-1 producing the
worst mispricing and Caltech-Utah-1 producing the best pricing, and across card games,
with Card Game 2 producing larger mispricing than the other treatments. Formally, the
median mispricing in Card Game 2 is significantly higher than that of Card Game 3 (p
value of 0.052; Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing the paired absolute mean mispricing
across the six experimental sessions and the two replications of each Card Game per
session), and also significantly higher than that of Card Game 4 (p value of 0.005).
Since in Treatment II there is aggregate risk, equilibrium prices differ from true ex-
pected payoffs even if all agents know how to compute correct probabilities because of
the presence of a risk premium. When compared to the session from Treatment I with
subjects from the same cohort (UCLA), average differences between transaction prices
20The third column of Table 4 reports the same for Treatment II.
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and correct expected payoffs (available from the authors) are indeed higher in all card
games. This suggests that a risk premium affected prices, and hence, that subjects were
risk averse. While expected in view of past experimentation with multi-security asset
pricing (Bossaerts and Zame, 2006), it is nevertheless comforting to confirm that agents
are risk averse, as we assumed.
Hypothesis 1: Presence of Price-Insensitive Subjects
Column 4 of Table 3 reports the number of price-sensitive subjects in Treatment I.
Price sensitivity is obtained from OLS projections of one-minute changes in a subject’s
holdings of Red Stock onto the difference between, (i) the mean traded price of Red
Stock (during the one-minute interval), and (ii) the expected payoff of Red Stock com-
puted using the correct probabilities.21 Agents who cannot update probabilities correctly
from cards discarded and displayed are assumed to perceive ambiguity when their priors
divert too much from market prices. Because they are ambiguity averse, they are price-
insensitive, which means that their choices produce a zero slope coefficient in the above
regression. To be reacting rationally to price changes, all other agents should decrease
holdings when prices increase, which means that the slope coefficients for these subjects
ought to be negative.
21We assume that agents who perceive ambiguity in a card game replication perceive it throughout the
entire replication. In principle, we could have enriched our analysis by considering the possibility that
some learned halfway through the replication after we provided further information about the cards, in
a way that could have changed their perception of ambiguity. Specifically, some subjects could have
switched from perceiving ambiguity to perceiving risk (or vice versa) between trading periods. We
did not consider this refinement because we did not have sufficient data (prices; changes in portfolio
allocations) to confidently determine price sensitivity over each trading period separately.
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The regression with which we determine price sensitivity suffers from a well-known
simultaneous-equations bias, because total changes in holdings must balance out across
subjects. Because slope coefficients must sum to zero, OLS estimates will be biased
upward. See Appendix B for details. Because the bias is upward, we use a generous
cut-off level to categorize our subjects as price-sensitive. In particular, we use a cut-off
of −1.65 for the t-statistic of the slope coefficient to determine that a subject is price-
sensitive. At the same time, we applied a conservative t-statistic level of 1.9 to categorize
whether a subject is price-sensitive in the other direction, namely, she increases holdings
of a security when prices increase (rather perversely, as mentioned before). Subjects with
t-statistics between −1.65 and 1.9 are deemed price-insensitive.
For Treatment I, Table 3, fourth column, reveals that generally only a minority of
subjects was price-sensitive and reacted to price changes in the right way (reducing
holdings when prices increased). In some instances only a single, and in one occasion
no subject was found to react systematically and correctly to price changes. The flip
side is that there always were some subjects who were price-insensitive over the range of
observed prices, and their number was at times substantial.
We do observe that a small fraction of subjects were price-sensitive in a perverse
way: they tended to increase their holdings for increasing prices. See the fifth column
of Table 3. There are two possible explanations of this finding. First, these are just
type II errors: the subjects at hand are really price-insensitive, but sampling error causes
the t-statistic to end up above 1.9. The second possibility is that we have identified
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subjects who are perversely price-sensitive. We could interpret their actions as reflecting
momentum trading or herding : higher prices are interpreted as signaling higher future
prices (momentum) or higher expected payoffs (herding). Our theory does not account
for such trading behavior. Since we cannot determine which of the two possible explana-
tions applies, we exclude subjects with t-statistics above 1.9 from the remainder of our
analysis.22
The results on price sensitivity for Treatment II are reported in Table 4. The numbers
(of price-sensitive, both correctly and incorrectly) are similar to those for Treatment I.
The relevant counterpart in Treatment I is the session UCLA, which drew participants
from the same subject cohort.
Hypothesis 2: Mispricing and Number of Price-Sensitive Subjects
Absent aggregate risk (i.e., in Treatment I), our theory predicts that mispricing (de-
fined as the absolute difference between the market price and expected payoffs computed
with correct probabilities) decreases with the number of price-sensitive agents (Hypoth-
esis 2).
The bottom of Table 3 reports two correlations (for Treatment I) when price sensitivity
is measured in two ways: (i) counting all subjects whose reaction to price changes is
significantly negative (t < −1.65); (ii) counting only those subjects whose reaction to
22In a previous version of the paper (available upon request from the authors) we presented our
results in two parts: one where we include the entire subject pool and one where we exclude those with
significantly positive slope coefficients (t > 1.9). None of our conclusions are affected qualitatively by
the exclusion of perversely price-sensitive subjects.
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price changes is significantly negative and whose average change in holdings is correct
given initial holdings. Both correlations are significantly negative (p < 0.01), lending
support to Hypothesis 2.
The bottom of Table 4 reports the same correlations for Treatment II. Here, however,
there is no specific reason for the correlations to be negative, because a risk premium
may interfere with pricing. Mispricing as we defined it now not only captures incorrect
computation of probabilities, but also risk aversion. While the correlations are negative,
they are smaller, and insignificant (p > 0.10).
Hypothesis 3: Portfolio Choices Depend On Price Sensitivity
With Treatment II, we can test an implication of our theory for equilibrium portfolio
holdings. Specifically, price-insensitive agents should be exposed to less risk than price-
sensitive ones because price-insensitive agents perceive ambiguity and avoid it trading to
balanced (risk-free) portfolios, while price-sensitive ones behave as in traditional asset
pricing theory, and in equilibrium, will share the aggregate risk in the economy and
choose risk-exposed portfolios.
A test of this hypothesis is important, because one alternative explanation for the
empirical support for Hypothesis 2 is that price-insensitive subjects are simply noise
traders, and hence, not necessarily ambiguity averse. The more noise traders in the
market, the worse the conformity of observed prices with theoretical predictions. So, if
true, the presence of noise traders would make the data look as if they are consistent with
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our theory, and Hypothesis 2 in particular. Support for Hypothesis 3, however, would
speak against this explanation, because the hypothesis requires that price-insensitive
agents do not make arbitrary choices, unlike noise traders.
We compute for each subject i and each Card Game j (j = 1, ..., 4) imbalances Iij
separately after the first and the second trading periods in each replication (since there
are 20 subjects per session , i = 1, ..., 120 for the treatment without risk, and i = 1, ..., 60
for the treatment with risk). Portfolio imbalance is defined to be the absolute difference
between the number of Red Stock and Black Stock in a subject’s portfolio. The goal is
to determine whether more price-sensitive subjects on average have larger imbalances in
their portfolio holdings.
Given that each subject participates in several Card Games, it is possible that some
subjects exhibit substantial co-variation in price sensitivity and portfolio imbalances
across the four Card Games, while others may show no co-variation whatsoever. If
we were to just look at the average relationship between price sensitivities and portfolio
imbalances pooling individuals and Card Games, we might then find a significant rela-
tionship that was due only to the within-subject variation of only a subset of subjects.
Our posited relationship of the effect of price sensitivity on portfolio imbalance is not
subject-specific; it is to hold between (across) subjects. To test this relationship, we
ought to filter for variability in the average portfolio imbalances that can be predicted
from within-subject variability in price sensitivity across Card Games. Technically, we
hypothesize that a subject’s price sensitivity (averaged across Card Games), explains the
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intercept in the within-subject regression (across Card Games) of portfolio imbalances
onto price sensitivities. Thus, we estimate the following two-level (random effects) model:
Iij = Ii + ηij,
Tij = Ti + ξij,
ηij = bwithinξij + δij,
Ii = a+ bbetweenTi + i, (5)
where Tij denotes subject i’s t-statistic of the slope coefficient in the price-sensitivity
regression for Card Game j and δij, ξij, ηij, and i are (assumed) normally distributed
mean-zero errors, i = 1, ....120 (60) for Treatment I (II). In addition δij, ξij, and i are
jointly independent. Note that both Iij and Tij are observed, while Ii and Ti are latent
variables. Ti is the mean price-sensitivity for subject i, while Ii is the intercept for subject
i of the within-subjects regression. We have allowed the deviations from mean imbalance
across card game situations to depend on the (deviations from mean) price-sensitivity of
the subject in each of those situations, as the third of the four equations above displays.
On the between-subjects level, we would expect that the less price-sensitive on average
an agent is (the higher the value of Ti), the lower this agent’s imbalance, i.e., bbetween
should be negative. Similarly, if in a given game situation a subject displays less price
sensitivity than this subject’s average, then in this situation the subject should also hold
a more balanced portfolio, i.e., bwithin is expected to be negative as well.
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We estimate the model in (5) twice for each treatment, once with imbalances collected
after the first trading period and second time with imbalances collected after the second
trading period. Throughout we focus on bbetween, which provides a filtered estimate of
the relationship between portfolio imbalance of a subject and price sensitivity. We do
not report the within-level parameter estimates (bwithin) as none were ever significantly
different from zero.23 Throughout, we used robust24 maximum likelihood estimation.
As prices move away from expected payoffs computed from true probabilities, risk
averse agents with correct beliefs choose more unbalanced portfolios. Therefore, our test
should have more power when mispricing (defined as the difference between transaction
prices and true expected payoffs) increases. Consequently, we also present estimation re-
sults for the between parameters for a specification that factors in the level of mispricing,
as follows:
Iij = Ii + ηij,
MTij = MTi + ξij,
ηij = bwithinξij + δij,
Ii = a+ bbetweenMTi + i, (6)
23That bwithin is not statistically different from zero implies that δij and ηij are independently dis-
tributed. However, within-subject co-variability of price sensitivity and portfolio imbalance may not be
estimated with much precision (i.e, bwithin may be very noisy). For example, if a subject always exhibits
about the same price sensitivity, the standard error of bwithin will be very large.
24We follow White (1980) and use a robust covarince matrix estimator. The models (5) and (5) were
estimated using the statistical package Mplus.
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where MTij = Mij ∗ Tij, and Mij is the mean absolute mispricing in the trading period
(first or second) of Card Game j of the session in which subject i participated and for
which the imbalance was measured, j = 1, .., 4, and i = 1, ...120 (60) for Treatment I
(II). The assumptions on the error terms are identical to those of model (5). As with
model (5), we estimate the model in (6) twice for each treatment, once with imbalances
and mispricing collected after the first trading period and second time with imbalances
and mispricing collected after the second trading period.
The results on the between-level estimates for Treatment II are displayed in boldface
in Table 5. The first column within Treatment II presents the estimates when imbalance
is measured after the second trading period of each replication; the second column shows
the estimates when imbalance is measured after the first trading period. All estimates are
highly significant. The standard errors produce t-statistics ranging from 2.8 to 4.3, and
hence, p-values below 0.005. R-squared’s are also high. The predicted effect is already
present at the end of the first trading period. By the end of the second trading period,
the magnitude of the effect increases (although not significantly). The predictions are
confirmed whether we adjust for (mean) absolute mispricing (as in model (6)) or not
(as in model (5)). We also obtain qualitatively similar results if we perform simple OLS
regression analysis (i.e., if we do not account for repeated subject observations but treat
each subject observation as an independent one instead).
For reference, Table 5 also displays results for Treatment I. In this treatment, there
is no aggregate risk. As a result, price-sensitive agents hold, in the aggregate, a bal-
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anced portfolio. While individual demand functions across price-sensitive agents vary
with their prior, given that we assume that price-sensitive agents are risk averse, for
reasonable parameter values (simulations are available from the authors), the imbalance
that price-sensitive agents would like in their portfolio is negligible.25 Given that as-
sets must be traded in discrete units, the approximation to the nearest integer leads to
a prediction that most or all price-sensitive agents (depending on parameters) acquire
a balanced portfolio, and hence, their choices are indistinguishable from those of the
price-insensitive subjects, who acquire a balanced portfolio at any price. Therefore, the
predicted relation between price-sensitivity and imbalance is at most a second-order ef-
fect of negligible magnitude. Indeed, all (between-level) coefficients have the predicted
sign, but are statistically insignificant; t-statistics implied by displayed standard errors
range from 0.5 to 1, and R2s are a fraction of those from Treatment II.
Consequently, our theory makes the right prediction across the two Treatments. When
an effect is predicted, it is present (Treatment II, aggregate risk); when the effect is
predicted to be at best negligible, it is not significant in the data (Treatment I, no
aggregate risk). Overall, the data therefore provide strong evidence for the conjecture
that price-insensitive agents behave in an ambiguity averse manner, and against the
alternative that price-insensitivity merely reflects noise trading.26
25For instance, for pir = 0.75, pi= 0.5, α = 0.5 and ε = 0.02, the predicted imbalance averaged over
all price-sensitive agents is 0.07 units; for price-insensitive it is 0; if agents can only acquire assets in
discrete (integer) units, the nearest approximation for almost all price-sensitive agents is to balance their
portfolio. In Treatment II, the average imbalance averaged over price-sensitive agents is 1.8 units, for
price-insensitive it is 0.
26It may be argued that price-insensitive subjects are not really ambiguity averse, but just follow a
rule of thumb, investing half their wealth in each of the risky securities. The findings in Bossaerts et al.
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We repeated our analysis using ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. Any differ-
ence of the results would stem from the “within” level noise in our data. While none
of the qualitative conclusions change, all coefficients decrease in magnitude, sometimes
significantly, as expected. The results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
V. Discussion
Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) describe how behavioral research (i) identifies “norma-
tive assumptions or models that are ubiquitously used by economists, such as Bayesian
updating”; (ii) identifies “anomalies–i.e., demonstrate[s] clear violations of the assump-
tions or model, and painstakingly rule[s] out alternative explanations”; (iii) uses “the
anomalies as inspiration to create alternative theories that generalize existing models”;
and (iv) constructs “economic models of behavior using the behavioral assumptions from
the third step, derive[s] fresh implications and test[s] them.” We have followed (i), (iii),
and (iv). In this section we suggest alternative individual behaviors within our setup
and counter the resulting aggregate predictions with the outcomes from our experiments.
Our theory relies on the assumption that upon being confronted with evidence that con-
tradicts, or is not in line with their (flawed) reasoning, subjects stop perceiving the world
as risky and perceive it as ambiguous instead. This assumption leads to the main insight
of our model, namely that (some of) those subjects become price-insensitive. Because
(2010) reject this interpretation, though. There, choices of price-insensitive agents do reveal ambiguity
aversion, but cannot be explained by the proposed rule of thumb.
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agents who Bayesian update correctly remain price-sensitive, pricing improves with the
number of price-sensitive agents.
We consider the following plausible alternative conjectures:
a) There are subjects who are exogenously price-insensitive, i.e., their behavior is
not a results of their failure to Bayesian update correctly. This conjecture would di-
rectly explain the existence of price-insensitive agents. Price-insensitivity could come
from exogenous aspirations to trade to a balanced portfolio. Such exogenously deter-
mined behavior would explain the relationship between price-insensitivity and security
imbalance in the treatment with aggregate risk. However, the empirical finding that
price quality correlates with the number of price-sensitive agents is not predicted under
exogenous price-insensitivity. Increasing or decreasing the number of exogenously price-
sensitive/insensitive agents would not change the quality of prices, as the price-sensitive
group’s expected (knowledge) composition would be independent of its (relative) size.27
b) Agent who doubt their own Bayesian updating react by not trading; instead of
aspiring to a balanced portfolio, they hold on to their initial (imbalanced) endowment.
This conjecture would explain the existence of price-insensitive agents, as well as the
observed correlation between price quality and the number of price-sensitive agents. It
would not, however, be consistent with the finding that the imbalance in a subject’s
final portfolio positively correlates with that subject’s price sensitivity. In fact, this
conjecture would lead to the opposite prediction within our experimental setup: portfolio
27A formalization of this claim is available from the authors.
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imbalance and price sensitivity should be negatively correlated. Furthermore, if those
who are price-insensitive trade little or not at all, we should observe a positive correlation
between number of trades and price sensitivity. While in the right direction, however,
the relationship is not statistically significant.
Within the lines of endowment-dependent portfolio choices, another possibility is that
beliefs are correlated with endowments. Subjects whose endowment is skewed towards
Black (Red) stock could surmise that Red stock is scarce (abundant) in the aggregate and
expect a higher (lower) market price for the Red security. Thus, one could conjecture that
subjects’ price sensitivity correlates positively with the interaction of their endowment
imbalance and signed mispricing. In the treatment with aggregate risk then, we would
expect that not only we would see prices higher than expected values, but also more price-
sensitive agents would come from the pool of subjects endowed with portfolios skewed
towards the Black security. However, the correlation coefficient between a dummy for
Black-skewed endowment and subject (average) price-sensitivity is negative (p-value of
0.06). Thus, if anything, the relationship is the opposite of the one conjectured.
c) A sophisticated alternative to the one proposed by our theory is that agents use
some weighing between their belief and the price they observe in the marketplace. If this
were the case, however, everyone would be price-sensitive, providing no explanation for
our empirical findings.
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d) Agents who doubt their own Bayesian updating react by disregarding their own
calculations and always treating the market price as if it were a perfect signal of the
expected return of the asset. This amounts to the degenerate case of point c), in which
all of the weight is assigned to the market price. The implications are very similar to those
of our explanation: under either scenario, confused subjects completely disregard their
own priors and seek a balanced portfolio at any price, which generates the same three
testable hypotheses. However, in the face of fluctuating market prices, the postulate
that the market price is always correct is refuted as many times as the price moves.
Therefore, one must assume that agents adhere to a conjecture they have seen refuted,
possibly multiple times. We view such persistent inconsistency as highly implausible.
Our own theory of bounded rationality better accounts for the experimental findings
by uncovering a two-way relationship between prices and beliefs, in which, importantly,
prices affect beliefs. Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) argue that “models of bounded ratio-
nality describe how a judgment or decision is reached [...] rather than merely the outcome
of the decision, and they describe the class of environments in which these heuristics will
succeed or fail.” We argue that investors who face difficult updating problems use the
following heuristic when they realize that they have reasoned incorrectly: they disregard
their own beliefs and hedge against the ambiguity that ensues. Since equilibrium prices
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stay close to their correct value, the application of this heuristic implies little loss to
those who use it.28
VI. Concluding Summary
We have presented a theory of asset trading with symmetric information but asymmetric
reasoning. The micro foundation of individual behavior in our theory is adapted from
Epstein and Schneider’s (2007) theory of learning under ambiguity. We assume that
agents who make mistakes in their calculations of the expected return of an asset lose
confidence in their calculations when confronted with a market price for the asset that
is far off from their calculated expected return. The market price thereby plays the role
of “authority” in the face of which agents are known to become ambiguity averse (Fox
and Tversky, 1995). Confronted with an environment that they no longer perceive as
risky but as ambiguous, these agents prefer to trade to portfolios that are not exposed
to uncertainty, and they become insensitive to prices, at least for a range of prices.
A prediction for a market with no aggregate risk follows: in equilibrium, price quality
(the proximity between price and the expected return of the asset) increases in the
proportion of price-sensitive agents (Hypothesis 2). We also predict that in a market with
aggregate risk, price-sensitive subjects should hold portfolios exposed to risk (imbalanced
portfolios) while price-insensitive agents trade to balanced positions (Hypothesis 3); in
28The average payoff (participation bonus of $5 included) to price-sensitive agents $51.75, that of
price-insensitive agents $47.17. While the payoffs are statistically different from one another, the price-
sensitivity premium is only 10%.
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contrast, we do not expect to find such a difference in agents’ holdings in an environment
without aggregate risk – there, all agents ought to trade to balanced or near-balanced
portfolios.
Experimental results are consistent with these predictions. In the experiments with
no risk, price quality improves significantly with the fraction of price-sensitive subjects; in
the experiments with risk, final holdings of price-sensitive subjects are more imbalanced
than those of price-insensitive subjects. Importantly, when our theory predicts that
the relation between portfolio imbalance and price-sensitivity will be negligible or non-
existent (in the case without aggregate risk), the relation is indeed insignificant in the
data.
Overall, our theory and experimental results support the claim that some agents who
reason incorrectly become price-insensitive and do not contribute to set equilibrium prices
in asset markets.
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Appendix
A. Mathematical Details
As we describe in Section II, an agent i who perceives ambiguity maximizes the following
expression:
min{ln(Ri), ln(Bi)}.
It immediately follows that the agent seeks a portfolio with Ri = Bi under any prices pR and
pB = 1− pR.
Let the price of R be pR. An expected utility maximizing agent i with belief piir maximizes
Ui(Ri, Bi) = pi
i
r ln (Ri) + (1− piir) ln (Bi).
The solution to this agent’s optimization problem given her endowment, which by assumption
is one unit of each asset, is Ri =
piir
pR
.
We calculate in turn the excess demand of knowledgeable agents, who correctly calculate
their prior and use it so that they perceive risk; confused agents who mistrust their prior and
do not use it, so that they perceive ambiguity; and biased agents who calculate their prior
incorrectly but use it so that they perceive risk.
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A.1. Excess demand of knowledgeable agents
Let qα denote the aggregate demand of red asset by the fraction α of agents who are able to
calculate the correct probabilities. Then qα =
∫ 1
1−αRi = α
pir
pR
. Thus, for any pR < pir the
knowledgeable agents create excess demand α
(
pir
pR
− 1
)
.
A.2. Excess demand of agents who perceive ambiguity
For any price pR the agents demand a risk neutral portfolio. Under the assumption of no
aggregate endowment uncertainty for any subinterval of agents, the ambiguity averse agents
create excess demand of 0.
A.3. Excess demand of price-sensitive biased agents
Note that from the assumption that  < α1+α(pir−pi) and α ≤ 1, it follows  < pir−pi2 . Conjecture
that pR +  > pir > pR > pR −  > pi; we later check that this conjecture is satisfied in the
equilibrium we construct, and that no alternative equilibrium exists if this conjecture is not
satisfied.
Let i be the agent such that piir = pR− , that is, i = 1−αpir−pi (pR−−pi). The excess demand
generated by the biased agents is
∫ 1−α
i
(
piir
pR
−1
)
di.
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Since piir = pi + i
pir−pi
(1−α) ,
∫ 1−α
i
(
piir
pR
− 1
)
di =
∫ 1−α
i
(
pi
pR
− 1
)
di+
∫ 1−α
i
pir − pi
(1− α)pR idi = −
pR − pi
pR
∫ 1−α
i
1di+
pir − pi
(1− α)pR
∫ 1−α
i
idi =
pir − pi
2(1− α)pR i
2|1−αi −
pR − pi
pR
i|1−αi =
pir − pi
2(1− α)pR ((1− α)
2 − i2)− pR − pi
pR
(1− α− i) =
pir − pi
2(1− α)pR (1− α− i)(1− α+ i)−
pR − pi
pR
(1− α− i) =
pir − pi
2(1− α)pR (1−α−
1− α
pir − pi (pR−pi−))(1−α+
1− α
pir − pi (pR−pi−))−
pR − pi
pR
(1−α− 1− α
pir − pi (pR−pi−)) =
(1−α)pir − pi
2pR
(1− 1
pir − pi (pR−pi−))(1+
1
pir − pi (pR−pi−))−(1−α)
pR − pi
pR
(1− 1
pir − pi (pR−pi−)) =
(1− α) 1
2pR(pir − pi)(pir − pR + )(pir − 2pi + pR − )− (1− α)
pR − pi
pR(pir − pi)(pir − pR + ) =
1− α
pR(pir − pi)(pir − pR + )(
1
2
(pir − 2pi + pR − )− (pR − pi)) =
1− α
2pR(pir − pi)(pir − pR + )(pir − pR − ).
Because (pir − pR− ) < 0, the excess demand is negative, i.e., the biased agents provide excess
supply to the market.
A.4. Equilibrium
In equilibrium the aggregate excess demand must be zero.
1− α
2pR(pir − pi)(pir − pR + )(pir − pR − ) + α
(
pir
pR
− 1
)
= 0⇔
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1− α
2pR(pir − pi)(pir − pR + )(pR + − pir) = α
(
pir
pR
− 1
)
⇔
1− α
2(pir − pi)(pir − pR + )(pR + − pir) = α(pir − pR)⇔
Denote pir − pR by y. Then
1− α
2(pir − pi)(y + )(− y) = αy.
Denote α1−α(pir − pi) by K. Then
y2 + 2Ky − 2 = 0.
The (positive) solution to the equation is y =
√
K2 + 2 − K. Note that lim
→0
y = 0, i.e. the
price converges to pir as  converges to zero.
The above derived equilibrium satisfies the conjecture that pR +  > pir > pR > pR −  > pi as
depicted in Figure 5.
To prove uniqueness, conjecture instead that pR> pir. Then the excess demand of all three
classes of agents are negative, hence there is no equilibrium with this price.
Finally, conjecture instead that pir> pR+. Then the excess demand of agents who perceive
ambiguity is zero, and the excess demand of biased price-sensitive agents is also zero, while if
α > 0 the excess demand of knowledgeable agents is strictly positive. Therefore, if α > 0, the
aggregate excess demand is strictly positive, and there is no equilibrium with this price.
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A.5. Comparative Statics
Since ∂K∂α =
(pir−pi)
(1−α)2 > 0 and
∂K
∂α
∂y
∂K =
K√
K2+2
− 1 < 0, it follows that dydα = ∂K∂α ∂y∂K < 0, i.e. the
difference between the price and the true probability decreases as α increases.
Let S(α, y) be the fraction of price-sensitive agents, as a function of the fraction of knowl-
edgeable agents and the mispricing, S = α + ( + y) 1−αpir−pi . Let y
∗(α) be the equilibrium mis-
pricing, as a function of α. Let S∗(α) = S(α, y∗(α)) be the fraction of price-sensitive agents
in equilibrium, as a function of alpha. Then,
S∗(α) = α +
+
√(
α
1− α(pir − pi)
)2
+ 2 − α
1− α(pir − pi)
 1− α
pir − pi =
= α +
1− α
pir − pi−
1− α
pir − pi
α
1− α(pir − pi)+
1− α
pir − pi
√(
α
1− α(pir − pi)
)2
+ 2
=
1− α
pir − pi+
1− α
pir − pi
√(
α
1− α(pir − pi)
)2
+ 2
=
1− α
pir − pi
+
√(
α
1− α(pir − pi)
)2
+ 2
 .
For any α then we obtain S∗(α) and y∗(α). If S∗(α) is strictly monotonic, we can invert it
and obtain α(S). We are interested in y(α(S)) and dy
dS
= dy
dα
dα
dS
. We know that dy
dα
< 0, hence
we must only determine the sign of dα
dS
, which, under our conjecture that S∗(α) is strictly
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monotonic, coincides with the sign of
dS∗(α)
dα
. Figure 6 presents the surface of dS
∗(α)
dα
for any α
and any , given pir−pi = 0.5. It illustrates that if  is not too large relative to α, the derivative
is positive. We show that given our assumption that  < α
1+α
(pir−pi), dS
∗(α)
dα
> 0 for every α,
so that indeed S∗(a) is strictly monotonic as assumed, and it follows dy
dS
< 0.
dS∗(α)
dα
= − 
pir − pi−
1
pir − pi
√(
α
1− α(pir − pi)
)2
+ 2+
α(pir − pi)
(1− α)2
((
α
1− α(pir − pi)
)2
+ 2
)−1/2
.
We want to show that given any  < α
1+α
(pir−pi),
− 
pir − pi−
1
pir − pi
√(
α
1− α(pir − pi)
)2
+ 2 +
α(pir − pi)
(1− α)2
√(
α(pir−pi)
(1−α)
)2
+ 2
> 0⇔
α(pir−pi)2
(1− α)2
√(
α(pir−pi)
(1−α)
)2
+ 2
−
√(
α(pir − pi)
(1− α)
)2
+ 2− > 0⇔
(pir−pi)
(1− α)
√
1 +
(
(1−α)
α(pir−pi)
)2 −
√(
α(pir − pi)
(1− α)
)2
+ 2− > 0.
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The left hand side expression is decreasing in , hence it suffices to show that the inequality
holds for  = α
1+α
(pir−pi).
(pir−pi)
(1− α)
√
1 +
(
(1−α) α
1+α
(pir−pi)
α(pir−pi)
)2 −
√(
α(pir − pi)
(1− α)
)2
+
α2
(1 + α)2
(pir − pi)2− α
1 + α
(pir−pi) > 0⇔
1
(1− α)
√
1 + (1−α)
2
(1+α)2
− α
√
1
(1− α)2 +
1
(1 + α)2
− α
1 + α
> 0⇔
(1 + α)
(1− α)
√
(1 + α)2 + (1− α)2
− α
(1− α)(1 + α)
√
(1 + α)2 + (1− α)2− α
1 + α
> 0⇔
(1 + α)2 − α((1 + α)2 + (1− α)2)− α(1− α)
√
(1 + α)2 + (1− α)2 > 0⇔
(1− α)(1 + α)2 − α(1− α)2 > α(1− α)
√
(1 + α)2 + (1− α)2 ⇔
(1 + α)2
α
− (1− α) >
√
(1 + α)2 + (1− α)2 ⇔
(1 + α)4
α2
+ (1− α)2 − 2(1 + α)
2
α
(1− α) > (1 + α)2 + (1− α)2 ⇔
(1 + α)2 − 2α(1− α) > α2 ⇔
1 + 2α2 > 0.
A.6. Heterogeneity
Here, we consider the case where some agents perceive ambiguity when their subjective belief
deviates from prices with an amount δ, whereas others perceive ambiguity when beliefs deviate
more than ε, where δ ≤ ε. We now prove that mispricing continues to decrease in the fraction
(here 2α) of agents who know how to compute probabilities (Corollary 1).
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Setting
We envisage a situation where is a continuum of agents on the interval I = [0, 1] and a con-
tinuum of agents on the interval J = [0, 1]. Any agent i ∈ [α, 1] ⊂ I and any j ∈ [α, 1] ⊂ J
updates correctly and always makes portfolio choices that maximize her expected utility accord-
ing to her (correct) subjective probability. Any agent i ∈ [0, α) ⊂ I makes portfolio choices
that maximize her expected utility according to her (incorrect) subjective probability if and
only if |piir−pR| < ε, otherwise she perceives ambiguity and maximizes maxmin utility. Any
agent j ∈ [0, α) ⊂ J makes portfolio choices that maximize her expected utility according her
(incorrect) subjective probability if and only if |pijr−pR| < δ, otherwise she perceives ambiguity
and optimizes maxmin utility.
An agent who perceives ambiguity maximizes the following expression:
min {ln(Ri), ln(Bi)}.
From here it immediately follows that the agent seeks a portfolio with Ri= Bi under any
prices pR and pB = 1− pR.
Let the price of R be pR. An expected utility maximizing agent i with belief pi
i
r maximizes
Ui(Ri, Bi) = pi
i
r ln (Ri) + (1− piir) ln(Bi).
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The solution to this agent’s optimization problem given her endowment, which by assumption
is one unit of each asset, is Ri=
piir
pR
.
Excess demand of knowledgeable agents
Let qα denote the aggregate demand of red asset by the fraction α of agents who are able
to calculate the correct probabilities. Then qα=
∫ 1
1−αRi=α
pir
pR
. Thus, for any pR< pir the
knowledgeable agents create excess demand α( pir
pR
−1).
Excess demand of agents who perceive ambiguity
For any price pR the agents demand risk neutral portfolio. Because of the assumption of
no aggregate endowment uncertainty for any subinterval of agents, the ambiguity averse agents
create excess demand of 0.
Excess demand of price-sensitive biased agents
Note that from the assumption that ε < α
1+α
(pir−pi) and α ≤ 1, it follows ε <pir−pi2 .
Case A) Conjecture that pR+ε > pir> pR+δ > pR−ε >pi.
The aggregate excess demand of biased agents in J is
∫ pR+δ
pR−δ (
x
pR
−1)dx = ( x2
2pR
−x)|pR+δpR−δ= 0.
The aggregate excess demand of biased agents in I follows the same calculation as in the
benchmark model, with the only difference that the overall size of the group is one half of what
it was in that benchmark case, so the aggregate excess demand is halved.
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1− α
4pR(pir−pi)
(pir−pR+ε)(pir−pR−ε).
Because (pir−pR−ε) < 0, the excess demand is negative, i.e., the biased agents provide excess
supply to the market.
Case B) Conjecture instead that pR+δ > pir> pR−ε >pi. Following analogous calculations
to those for the I group, but substituting δ for ε at every step, the excess demand of biased
agents in group J is
1− α
4pR(pir − pi)
(pir−pR+δ)(pir−pR−δ).
Equilibrium
Case A) In equilibrium the aggregate excess demand must be zero.
1− α
4pR(pir − pi)
(pir−pR+ε)(pir−pR−ε) + α(
pir
pR
−1) = 0⇔
1− α
4pR(pir − pi)
(pir−pR+ε)(pR+ε− pir) = α(
pir
pR
−1)⇔
1− α
4(pir − pi)(pir−pR+ε)(pR+ε− pir) = α(pir−pR).
Denote pir−pR by y. Then
1− α
4(pir − pi)(y + ε)(ε− y) = αy.
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Denote α
1−α(pir−pi) by K. Then
1
4
(ε+ y)(ε− y) = Ky.
The (positive) solution to the equation is
y =
√
4K2+ε2−2K.
Note that lim
ε→0
y = 0, i.e. the price converges to pir as ε converges to zero.
The above derived equilibrium satisfies the conjecture that pR+ε > pir> pR+δ > pR − ε >pi
if and only if
δ ≤
√
4K2 + ε2−2K.
Otherwise we are on case B).
Case B). In equilibrium aggregate excess demand must be zero.
1− α
4pR(pir − pi)
[(pir−pR+ε)(pir−pR−ε) + (pir−pR+δ)(pir−pR−δ)] + α(
pir
pR
−1) = 0⇔
1− α
4pR(pir − pi) [2(pir−pR)
2−ε2−δ2] = −α( pir
pR
−1)⇔
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1− α
4(pir − pi)(2y
2−ε2−δ2) = −αy ⇔
2y2−ε2−δ2 = −4Ky
2y2+4Ky − (ε2+δ2) = 0
y =
−4K+
√
16K2+8(ε2+δ2)
4
y =
√
K2+
ε2+δ2
2
−K.
Therefore, the equilibrium with the two populations I and J is identical to the equilibrium
with a unique population with parameter εavg=
√
2+δ2
2
.
Comparative Statics
Case A) Since ∂K
∂α
= (pir−pi)
(1−α)2 > 0 and
∂y
∂K
= K√
4K2+2
− 2 < 0, it follows that dy
dα
= ∂y
∂K
∂K
∂α
<
0, i.e. the difference between the price and the true probability decreases as α increases.
Case B) Since ∂K
∂α
= (pir−pi)
(1−α)2 > 0 and
∂y
∂K
= K√
K2+ε2avg
−1 < 0, it follows that dy
dα
= ∂y
∂K
∂K
∂α
<
0, i.e. the difference between the price and the true probability decreases as α increases.
In both cases, mispricing decreases in the fraction of agents who know how to compute
probabilities, confirming Corollary 1.
In regard to Corollary 2, first note that for Case B the proof for a homogeneous epsilon
applies by taking the value of epsilon to be εavg=
√
2+δ2
2
.
For Case A, on the other hand, let S(α, y) be the fraction of price-sensitive agents, as a
function of the fraction of knowledgeable agents and the mispricing, S = α+(δ+ ε+y2 )
1−α
pir−pi . Let
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y∗(α) be the equilibrium mispricing, as a function of α. Let S∗(α) = S(α, y∗(α)) be the fraction
of price-sensitive agents in equilibrium, as a function of alpha. Recall y =
√
4K2+ε2−2K
and K = α
1−α(pir−pi). Then,
S∗(α) = α+
(
δ +
ε
2
+
1
2
(√
4K2 + ε2 − 2 α
1− α
)
(pir − pi)
)
1− α
pir − pi=
=
1− α
pir − pi
(
δ +
ε
2
)
+
1− α
2 (pir − pi)
√
4K2 + ε2.
For any α we obtain S∗(α) and y∗(α). If S∗(a) is strictly monotonic, we can invert it and
obtain α(S). We are interested in y(α(S)) and dy
dS
= dy
dα
dα
dS
. We know that dy
dα
< 0, hence
we must only determine the sign of dα
dS
, which, under our conjecture that S∗(a) is strictly
monotonic, coincides with the sign of
dS∗(α)
dα
.
dS∗(α)
dα
=
1
2
(
− 2δ + ε
(pir − pi) −
√
4K2 + ε2
(pir − pi) +
(
4α(pir − pi)
(1− α)2√4K2 + ε2
))
.
We want to show that
dS∗(a))
dα
> 0. Because dS
∗(α)
dα
is decreasing in both ε and δ, it suffices to
show that
dS∗(α)
dα
> 0 given ε = ε = α
1+α
(pir − pi) and δ =δ=
√
4K2 − ε2−2K.
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dS∗(α)
dα
|ε=ε,δ=δ
=
1
2
(
−2(
√
4K2 + ε2 − 2K) + ε
(pir − pi) −
√
4K2 + ε2
(pir − pi) +
4α(pir − pi)
(1− α)2√4K2 + ε2
)
=
1
2
(
−3(
√
4K2 + ε2)
(pir − pi) −
−4K + ε
(pir − pi) +
4α(pir − pi)
(1− α)2√4K2 + ε2
)
=
1
2
−3
√
4
(
α
1− α
)2
+
(
α
1 + α
)2
+ 4
α
1− α −
α
1 + α
+
4α
(1− α)2
√
4
(
α
1−α
)2
+
(
α
1+α
)2

=
α
2(1− α2)
(
−3
√
4(1 + α)2 + (1− α)2 + 5α + 3 + 4(1 + α)
2
α
√
4(1 + α)2 + (1− α)2
)
.
Figure 7 displays the graph of
dS∗(α)
dα
given ε = ε and δ = δ, and demonstrates that it is always
positive, i.e., the number of price-sensitive agents is positively related to α.
B. Biased Slope Coefficients
To determine whether there is any simultaneous-equation bias on the estimated slope coefficients
induced by overall balance in the changes in positions, we translate our setting into a more
familiar framework, namely, that of a simple demand-supply setting. In particular, we are
going to interpret (minus) the changes in endowments of the price-insensitive subjects as the
supply in a demand-supply system with exogenous, price-insensitive supply, while the changes
in endowments of the price-sensitive subjects correspond to the (price-sensitive) demands in a
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demand-supply system. The requirement that changes in holdings balance then corresponds to
the usual restriction that demand equals supply.
We will consider only the case where price-sensitive subjects reduce their holdings when
prices increase; translated into the usual demand-supply setting, this means that we assume
that the slope of the demand equation is negative.
Assume there are only two subjects. One is price-sensitive, the other is price-insensitive.
The former’s changes in holdings corresponds to the demand D˜ in the traditional demand-supply
system; the latter’s changes corresponds to the (exogenous) supply S˜. The usual assumptions
are as follows:
D˜ = A+BP + ,
with B < 0, and
S˜ = η,
where  is mean zero, and is independent of η. P denotes price.
We want to know the properties of the OLS estimate of B. Assume that P is determined
by equating demand and supply (equivalent to balance between changes in holdings), i.e., from
D˜ = S˜.
Then:
cov(P, ) = − 1
B
var() > 0.
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Because of this, standard arguments show that the OLS estimate of B is inconsistent, with an
upward bias. As such, the nominal size of the usual t-test under-estimates the true size, and
one should apply a generous cut-off in order to determine whether B is significantly negative.
In our case, however, we only need to identify who is price-sensitive (i.e., whose holdings
changes correspond to D in the demand-supply setting?) and who is not (whose holdings
changes correspond to S˜?). For this, we just run an OLS projection of changes in endowments
on prices. The subjects with significantly negative slope coefficients are price-sensitive and
hence, map into the demand D˜ of the traditional demand-supply system. The argument above,
however, indicated that this test is biased. Therefore, a generous cut-off should be chosen; we
chose a cut-off equal to 1.6.
While we did not need this for our study, one can obtain an improved estimate of the price
sensitivity once subjects are categorized as either price-sensitive or price-insensitive. Indeed,
the changes in the holdings of the price-insensitive subjects can be used as instrument to re-
estimate the price-sensitivity of the price-sensitive subjects. This is equivalent to using S˜ as an
instrument to estimate B. Indeed, S˜ (= η) and  are uncorrelated, while S˜ and P are correlated
(cov(S˜, P ) = var(S˜)/B), so S˜ is a valid instrument to estimate B in standard instrumental-
variables analysis.
C. Experiment Instructions
I. THE EXPERIMENT
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1. Situation The experiment consists of a sequence of trading sessions, referred to as
periods. At the beginning of even-numbered periods, you will be given a fresh supply of securities
and cash; in odd-numbered periods, you carry over securities and cash from the previous period.
Markets open and you are free to trade some of your securities. You buy securities with cash
and you get cash if you sell securities.
At the end of odd-numbered periods, the securities expire, after paying dividends that will
be specified below. These dividends, together with your cash balance, constitute your period
earnings. Securities do not pay dividends at the end of even-numbered periods and cash is
carried over to the subsequent period, so your period earnings in even-numbered periods will
be zero.
Period earnings are cumulative across periods. At the end of the experiment, the cumulative
earnings are yours to keep, in addition to a standard sign-up reward.
During the experiment, accounting is done in real dollars.
2. The Securities You will be given two types of securities, stocks and bonds. Bonds pay
a fixed dividend at the end of a period, namely, $0.50. Stocks pay a random dividend. There
are two types of stocks, referred to as Red and Black. Their payoff depends on the drawing
from a deck of 4 cards, as explained later. The payoff is either $0.50 or nothing. When Red
stock pays $0.50, Black stock pays nothing; when Red stock pays nothing, Black stock pays
$0.50.
You will be able to trade Red stock as well as bonds, but not Black stock.
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You won’t be able to buy Red stock or bonds unless you have the cash. You will be able
to sell Red stock and bonds (and get cash) even if you do not own any. This is called short
selling. If you sell, say, one Red stock, then you get to keep the sales price, but $0.50 will be
subtracted from your period earnings after the market closes and if the payoff on Red stock is
$0.50. If at the end of a period you are holding, say, -1 bonds, $0.50 will be subtracted from
your period earnings.
The trading system checks your orders against bankruptcy: you will not be able to submit
orders which, if executed, are likely to generate negative period earnings.
3. How Payoffs Are Determined Each period, we start with a deck of 4 cards: one
hearts (♥), one diamonds (♦), one clubs (♣) and one spades (♠). The cards are shuﬄed and
put in a row, face down.
Our computer takes randomly one or two cards and it discards them.
From the remaining cards, our computer randomly picks one or two cards. If one of these
cards is hearts (♥), then the computer puts it back and picks another one. Sometimes, the
computer will even put back diamonds (♦) and pick another one. The computer then reveals
the card(s) it picked and we will announce this in the News Page at the end of the period (after
that, another period starts with the same securities in which you can trade again). Note that
the revealed card(s) will never be hearts, and sometimes may not even be diamonds.
Before each period, the News Page will provide all the information that you need to make
the right inferences: (i) whether one or two cards are going to be discarded initially, (ii) whether
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one or two cards are going to be picked from the remaining cards and whether diamonds will
ever be shown.
After we show the revealed cards, one or two cards remain in the deck. Our computer
randomly picks a card and this last card determines the payoff on the securities.
Red stock pays $0.50 when the last card is either hearts (♥) or diamonds (♦). In those
cases, the Black stock pays nothing. This is shown in the following Payoff Table.
Red Stock Black Stock
If last card is ♥ or ♦ $0.50 0
If last card is ♣ or ♠ 0 $0.50
Here is an example. Initially there are 4 cards in the deck, randomly shuﬄed. They are put
in a row, face down, like this:
   
Our computer randomly discards one card (the third one in this case):
  
Our computer then randomly picks one card (the fourth one in this case), and reveals it,
provided it is not hearts or diamonds (in this case; if it is hearts or diamonds, it replaces it
with another card from the deck that is neither):
  ♠
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From the remaining two cards, our computer picks one at random that determines the payoffs
on the stocks.
♦  ♠
In this case, the last card picked is diamonds. As a result, you would be paid $0.50 for each
unit of Red stock you’re holding, and nothing for the Black stock you’re holding.
Here is another example. Initially there are 4 cards in the deck, randomly shuﬄed. They
are put in a row, face down:
   
Our computer randomly discards two cards (the second and third ones in this case):
 
Our computer then randomly picks one card and reveals it, provided it is not hearts (if it is
hearts, it replaces it with another card from the deck):
♦ 
Our computer then picks the remaining card, which determines the payoffs on the stocks.
♦ ♥
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In this case, the last card picked is hearts. As a result, you would be paid $0.50 for each unit
of Red stock you’re holding, and nothing for the Black stock you’re holding.
Again, the announcements of the number of cards that will be discarded initially and re-
vealed at the end of the period can be found in the News page. This page will also display the
card(s) that are turned over at the end of the period, and, at the end of the subsequent period,
the final card that determines the payoff on the Stocks.
II. THE MARKETS INTERFACE, jMARKETS Once you click on the Partic-
ipate link to the left, you will be asked to log into the markets, and you will be connected to
the jMarkets server. After everybody has logged in and the experiment is launched, a markets
interface like the one below will appear
1. Active Markets
73
The Active Markets panel is renewed each period. In it, you’ll see several scroll-down
columns. Each column corresponds to a market in one of the securities. The security name is
indicated on top. At the bottom, you can see whether the market is open, and if so, how long
it will remain open. The time left in a period is indicated on the right hand side above the
Active Markets panel.
At the top of a column, you can also find your current holdings of the corresponding security.
Your current cash holdings are given on the right hand side above the Active Markets panel.
Each column consists of a number of price levels at which you and others enter offers to
trade. Current offers to sell are indicated in red; offers to buy are indicated in blue. When
pressing the Center button on top of a column, you will be positioned halfway between the best
offer to buy (i.e., the highest price at which somebody offers to buy) and the best offer to sell
(i.e., the lowest price that anybody offers to sell at).
When you move your cursor to a particular price level box, you get specifics about the
available offers. On top, at the left hand side, you’ll see the number of units requested for
purchase. Each time you click on it, you send an order to buy one unit yourself. On top, at the
right hand side, the number of units offered for sale is given. You send an order to sell one unit
each time you yourself click on it. At the bottom, you’ll see how many units you offered. (Your
offers are also listed under Current Orders to the right of the Active Markets panel.) Each time
you hit cancel, you reduce your offer by one unit.
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If you click on the price level, a small window appears that allows you to offer multiple
units to buy or to sell, or to cancel offers for multiple units at once.
2. History
The History panel shows a chart of past transaction prices for each of the securities. Like
the Active Markets panel, it refreshes every period. jMarkets randomly assigns colors to each
of the securities. E.g., it may be that the price of the Red Stock is shown in blue. Make sure
that this does not confuse you.
3. Current Orders
The Current Orders panel lists your offers. If you click on one of them, the corresponding
price level box in the Active Markets panel is highlighted so that you can easily modify the
offer.
4. Earnings History
The Earnings History table shows, for each period, your final holdings for each of the
securities (and cash), as well as the resulting period earnings.
5. How Trade Takes Place
Whenever you enter an offer to sell at a price below or equal to that of the best available
buy order, a sale takes place. You receive the price of the buy order in cash. Whenever you
enter an offer to buy at a price above or equal to that of the best available sell order, a purchase
takes place. You will be charged the price of the sell order.
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The system imposes strict price-time priority: buy orders at high prices will be executed
first; if there are several buy orders at the same price level, the oldest orders will be executed
first. Analogously, sell orders at low prices will be executed first, and if there are several sell
orders at a given price level, the oldest ones will be executed first.
6. Restrictions On Offers
Before you send in an offer, jMarkets will check two things: the cash constraint, and the
bankruptcy constraint.
The cash constraint concerns whether you have enough cash to buy securities. If you send
in an offer to buy, you need to have enough cash. To allow you to trade fast, jMarkets has an
automatic cancellation feature. When you submit a buy order that violates the cash constraint,
the system will automatically attempt to cancel buy orders you may have at lower prices, until
the cash constraint is satisfied and your new order can be placed.
The bankruptcy constraint concerns your ability to deliver on promises that you implicitly
make by trading securities. We may not allow you to trade to holdings that generate losses in
some state(s). A message appears if that is the case and your order will not go through.
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Tables and Figures
TABLE 1
PARAMETERS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Experimenta Subject Signup Initial Allocationsb
Category Reward Red Stock Black Stock Bonds Cash
(Number) (Dollar) (Units) (Units) (Units) (Dollar)
Treatment I: Sessions With No Aggregate Risk
Caltech 10 5 0 9 0 4
10 5 12 3 0 1
Utah-1 10 5 0 9 0 4
10 5 12 3 0 1
Caltech-Utah-1 10 5 0 9 0 4
10 5 12 3 0 1
UCLA 10 5 0 9 0 4
10 5 12 3 0 1
Utah-2 10 5 0 9 0 4
10 5 12 3 0 1
Caltech-Utah-2 10 5 0 9 0 4
10 5 12 3 0 1
Treatment II: Sessions With Aggregate Risk
UCLA-R1 11 5 0 9 0 4
9 5 12 3 0 1
UCLA-R2 11 5 0 9 0 4
9 5 12 3 0 1
UCLA-R3 11 5 0 9 0 4
9 5 12 3 0 1
aIndicates affiliation of subjects. “Utah” refers to the University of Utah; “Utah-Caltech” refers
to: 50% of subjects were Caltech-affiliated; the remainder were students from the University of Utah.
Experiments are listed in chronological order of occurrence.
bRenewed each period.
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TABLE 2
CARD GAME SITUATIONS
Probability of Last Card
# of Cards Number being Red
Card Used In Discarded of Cards Cards Before After After
Game Repli- Before Revealed Never Half-Time Black Red
Situation cations Revelation Half-Time Revealed Revelation Card Card
1 1, 5 1 2 ♥ 5/6 1a 3/4
2 2, 7 1 1 ♥ 7/12 11/16 3/8
3 3, 6 2 1 ♥ 2/3 3/4 1/2
4 4, 8 1 1 ♥, ♦ 3/4 3/4 3/4
aIn Card Game Situation 1 two cards are discarded and hearts is never revealed. As a result, one
of the cards revealed after the half-time is necessarily a black card. Consequently, it is the color of the
second card that matters for the posterior probabilities of the last card being red.
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TABLE 3
NUMBER OF PRICE-SENSITIVE AGENTS AND MISPRICING IN TREATMENT I
Experiment Card Mean Abs. a N(Tb<−1.65)
b N(Tb>1.9)
c N(Tb<−1.65,Tacorrect)
d Signed M
Game Mispricing M
Caltech 1 3.13 7 2 6 -2.74
2 5.54 3 2 2 5.24
3 3.40 2 2 1 3.24
4 1.25 4 6 2 1.17
Utah-1 1 3.50 3 1 2 3.50
2 11.79 1 2 0 11.79
3 11.28 0 1 0 11.28
4 7.24 1 0 0 7.24
Caltech-Utah-1 1 3.35 5 1 1 -3.35
2 4.75 2 0 0 4.71
3 1.62 2 0 2 1.49
4 1.89 5 3 3 1.62
UCLA 1 4.86 2 1 1 -4.73
2 5.07 3 0 1 5.01
3 2.53 3 3 3 -0.66
4 2.9 3 0 2 -1.51
Utah-2 1 7.68 2 0 0 -7.39
2 8.07 3 2 2 5.63
3 5.56 6 2 3 5.63
4 3.99 2 2 2 1.56
Caltech-Utah-2 1 8.44 1 0 0 -8.44
2 2.51 2 0 2 -0.66
3 2.66 3 1 1 -2.44
4 3.24 3 0 2 -2.44
Corr(M,N(Tb<−1.65)) = −0.528 Corr(M,N(Tb<−1.65,Tacorrect)) = −0.554
(St. Errore = 0.147) (St. Error = 0.141)
aM is the (absolute) difference between average transaction price and expected payoffs computed
with correct probabilities, expressed in U.S. cents.
bNumber of subjects for which {Tb < −1.65}. Tb is the t-statistic of the slope coefficient estimate in
projections of one-minute changes in individual holdings of Red Stock (R) onto difference between (i)
last traded price, and (ii) expected payoff using correct probabilities.
cNumber of subjects for which {Tb > 1.9}.
dNumber of subjects for which {Tb < −1.65} and Ta has the correct sign. Ta is the t-statistic of the
intercept in projections of one-minute changes in individual holdings of Red Stock (R) onto difference
between (i) last traded price, and (ii) expected payoff using correct probabilities.
eAll standard errors of the correlation estimate ρˆ obtained using a sample size of n are computed as
1−ρˆ2√
n
.
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TABLE 4
NUMBER OF PRICE-SENSITIVE AGENTS AND MISPRICING IN TREATMENT II
Experiment Card Mean Abs.a N(Tb<−1.65)
b N(Tb>1.9)
c N(Tb<−1.65,Tacorrect)
d Signed M
Game Mispricing M
UCLA-1R 1 2.02 0 1 0 0.49
2 10.91 0 1 0 10.91
3 4.87 4 1 4 4.16
4 3.64 0 1 0 3.61
UCLA-2R 1 3.91 3 2 1 3.85
2 12.30 1 0 0 12.30
3 8.79 5 4 2 8.75
4 6.60 2 2 1 6.59
UCLA- 3R 1 6.43 2 0 1 -6.38
2 6.06 3 2 0 6.06
3 2.66 3 2 3 0.53
4 3.30 1 0 1 -2.58
Corr(M,N(Tb<−1.65)) = 0.000 Corr(M,N(Tb<−1.65,Tacorrect)) = −0.258
(St. Error = 0.289) (St. Error = 0.269)
aM is the (absolute) difference between average transaction price and expected payoffs computed
with correct probabilities, expressed in U.S. cents.
bNumber of subjects for which {Tb < −1.65}. Tb is the t-statistic of the slope coefficient estimate in
projections of one-minute changes in individual holdings of Red Stock (R) onto difference between (i)
last traded price, and (ii) expected payoff using correct probabilities.
cNumber of subjects for which {Tb > 1.9}.
dNumber of subjects for which {Tb < −1.65} and Ta has the correct sign. Ta is the t-statistic of the
intercept in projections of one-minute changes in individual holdings of Red Stock (R) onto difference
between (i) last traded price, and (ii) expected payoff using correct probabilities.
87
TABLE 5
PRICE SENSITIVITY AND PORTFOLIO IMBALANCES
Independent Treatment I Treatment II
Variable (No Aggregate Risk) (Aggregate Risk)
Second First Second First
Trading Period Trading Period Trading Period Trading Period
T -13.182a -11.363 -10.674 -9.836
(23.279)b (17.669) (3.833) (3.123)
[0.066]c [0.078] [0.247] [0.293]
MT -0.907 -2.562 -2.189 -1.964
(1.521) (2.624) (0.56) (0.453)
[0.02] [0.144] [0.352] [0.457]
aSlope coefficient
bStandard error, corrected for heteroskedasticity and subject clustering.
cR2.
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Figure 1. Beliefs. Graphical display of the relation between agent index (horizontal
axis) and belief that security R will pay (vertical axis). The correct belief equals pir.
Incorrect beliefs are assumed to be below the correct belief, with a minimum equal to pi.
Agents are indexed continuously from 0 to 1. A fraction α holds correct beliefs.
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Figure 2. jMarkets Trading Interface Used For Practice Sessions. Books with
limit buy orders (shown in blue) and sell orders (shown in pink) for three markets, Stock
A, Stock B and Bond, are represented as scrollable columns of price levels. The “Center”
button allows traders to scroll down to the price level halfway between the best buy and
sell orders. The book for Stock B is grey because no trade is allowed (the market is
“closed” – see Status underneath the book). To the right are a number of useful aids,
such as a chart of past trade prices, a list of current offers, and earnings history. jMarkets
is described in more detail at http://jmarkets.ssel.caltech.edu/.
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Figure 3. News Web Page. The page is filled gradually as cards are discarded and/or
revealed (only the first six replications are included above).
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Figure 4. Evolution of Transaction Prices of Stock R in Treatment I. Blue
crosses show transaction prices. Black vertical lines delineate periods. Dashed vertical
lines indicate mid-period point in time when cards are partially revealed. Red horizontal
line segments show true values of Stock R in the first half of the period. Green horizontal
line segments indicate true values after mid-period revelation of cards. (a) Caltech; (b)
Utah-1; (c) Caltech-Utah-1; (d) UCLA; (e) Utah-2; and, (f) Caltech-Utah-2.
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Figure 5. Equilibrium Price pR. Agents with subjective beliefs within  of the price
pR stick to their beliefs (they “agree to disagree” with the market). Those with subjective
beliefs below pR −  become ambiguity averse because their beliefs are too much at odds
with the market (price). The equilibrium price will be such that some agents with
beliefs sufficiently close to the correct belief (piR) continue to affect the price. As α, the
proportion of agents with correct beliefs, increases, mispricing (|p− piR|) decreases. The
opposite obtains as , the maximum dissonance between subjective beliefs and market
prices for which agents agree to disagree, increases.
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Figure 6. Change in Fraction of Price-Insensitive Agents with Changes Frac-
tion of Agents with Correct Beliefs ∂S
∂α
, as a Function of α (Fraction of Agents
with Correct Beliefs) and  (Maximum Dissonance between Subjective Beliefs
and Market Prices for which Agents Agree to Disagree. Assumed: pir− pi = 0.5.
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Figure 7. dS(α)
dα
evaluated at ε = α
1+α
(pir − pi) and δ=
√
4K2 − ε2−2K.
The figure plots the lower bound on the derivative of the fraction of price-sensitive agents
as a function of the fraction of agents with correct beliefs. Since this lower bound is
everywhere strictly positive, the derivative is strictly positive for any α, ε and δ.
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